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SETTING OPTIMAL RULES FOR SHAREHOLDER
PROXY ACCESS
Brett H. McDonnell*
Recent developments in Delaware concerning shareholder bylaws and
the new SEC rules concerning shareholder proxy access have (partly)
moved the United States closer to a set of optimal rules for shareholder
proxy access in nominating director candidates, but not all the way there.
These rules must address both the default rule, which applies in the absence
of agreement within a corporation to the contrary, and the altering rule,
which specifies who within a corporation may choose to opt out of the
default provisions. Applying principles of accountability and freedom of
contract, the optimal default rule would allow for certain shareholders to
use the corporate proxy to nominate director candidates. The optimal
altering rule would make it easy for shareholders to propose bylaws under
the Rule 14a-8 process to opt out of the default provisions. Although it
would be desirable were states to set these rules on their own, a degree of
managerialism at the state level combines with the history of extensive SEC
regulation of the proxy process to give the SEC an important role in helping
set the rules. Delaware is appropriately flexible but has the wrong default
rule, while the SEC's new rules have the right default rule but too little
flexibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholders are getting feisty. They are no longer content simply to
abide by the "Wall Street rule."' If they are unhappy with the performance
of a company's management, they do not simply sell their shares. Rather,
they step in to try to change that management or to change some of the rules
governing the corporation. This is not true for all shareholders, of course,
but it is for an important and growing class of them. In recent years, the
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank Joseph Grundfest,
Claire Hill, Paul L. Rubin, and Dan Schwarcz for helpful comments.
1. Under the Wall Street rule, dissatisfied shareholders simply sell their shares rather than
engage in more costly efforts to complain or try to change behavior. See William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle's Footsteps: The Trail of The Modem Corporation's Last
Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 849, 864 (2010).
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struggle of these activist shareholders to wrest some degree of power from
corporate directors and officers has led to important developments in state
corporate law and federal securities law.
Shareholders elect the board of directors. If they are unhappy with a
company's performance, they can throw the bums out and replace them
with someone better. That is the theory. In practice, for public corporations2
without a controlling shareholder, the incumbent board controls the
company's proxy material distributed to its shareholders.' Boards could
choose to allow challengers to their nominees to use the company's
material, or they could choose not to do so. Guess what boards choose to
do? Denied access to the corporate proxy, shareholders must either launch
their own proxy solicitation or leave the field to the board's nominees.
Proxy solicitations are generally too expensive for anyone except someone
attempting to seize a controlling number of shares. So, board nominees are
almost always left uncontested.
Frustrated with this situation, in recent years activist shareholders have
attempted to rewrite the rules to allow their nominees to be included in
corporate proxy materials, greatly lowering the costs of running a dissident
slate. Sometimes they have tried to rewrite the rules in individual
corporations.' However, the only way for shareholders to do that on their
own is by amending the corporation's bylaws.' Recent state law
developments have made this possible,' but the federal rules governing the
process of shareholder proposals have effectively blocked this route.' In
response, shareholders have tried to rewrite the rules for all public
corporations at once. Knowing that most states, especially Delaware, are
unlikely to adopt their agenda, they have turned to the SEC. The
Commission has responded by rewriting the rules in this area.'
This article surveys the recent state and federal developments concerning
proxy access as well as shareholder bylaw proposals concerning proxy
access. I argue that Delaware and the SEC have moved closer to an optimal
2. Throughout this article I am concerned only with public corporations covered by the
proxy rules of the federal securities laws.
3. In Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010
2011), creates the power for proxy voting, while the power to decide what goes into a
corporation's proxy material is part of the general broad grant of authority to the board under §
14 1(a).
4. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Emps. Pension Plan v. Am. Int'l
Grp., 462 F.3d 121, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2006).
5. Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills,
3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 205, 210 (2005) [hereinafter McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws].
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.A.
8. See infra Part V.
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set of rules. However, both state and federal law still have room for
improvement.
To understand this area, we need to consider both the relevant default
and altering rules, as these are shaped by both federal and state law. Default
rules refer to the rules that apply to all corporations (of a relevant type) in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary.' Altering rules are the legal
rules that define how a particular corporation can agree to be governed by
provisions that differ from the default rule.'o Both state and federal law help
define the current default and altering rules for proxy access, and a major
point of contention in the current debate is the proper role of federal and
state law in setting these rules."
Before the new SEC rules, the default rule for all but North Dakota
corporations was that shareholders did not have access to the corporate
proxy materials to make board nominations. How could corporations opt
out of that situation? Boards can always include shareholder nominees
under any circumstances they choose; almost universally, they choose not
to. The only power under corporate law that shareholders have to initiate
changes in corporate governance rules is through the bylaws. The scope of
the shareholder bylaw power has been a matter of some mystery for years.'2
The Delaware Supreme Court recently started to delineate the scope of the
bylaw power in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, concluding
that shareholders may enact "procedural" bylaws. ' Unless carefully
drafted, these bylaws may run afoul of the board's fiduciary duty.
Furthermore, it remains quite possible that boards can amend or repeal
shareholder bylaws. From a shareholder perspective, these limits on the
bylaw power are probably more annoyances than major roadblocks in the
current altering rules. The real impediment is the SEC's Rule 14a-8. This
rule allows shareholders to use the corporate proxy to make a wide range of
proposals, including proposed amendments to the bylaws.14 However, prior
to the new SEC rules, Rule 14a-8 allowed boards to exclude from the proxy
9. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
10. Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 6 (2006); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky
Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REv. 383, 383, 385 n.6 (2007)
[hereinafter McDonnell, Sticky Defaults].
11. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
12. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of
Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605, 605-07 (1997); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the
Street?, 73 TULANE L. REv. 409, 410-21 (1998); McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, supra note
5, at 207-09.
13. 953 A.2d 227, 234-36 (Del. 2008).
14. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010).
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proposals suggesting a bylaw that allowed shareholders access to the
corporate proxy for nominating directors. By denying shareholders access
for proposing proxy access, the SEC had effectively created an altering rule
whereby it was prohibitively expensive for shareholders on their own to opt
out of the no-proxy-access default rule.
The SEC's new rules set both the default and the altering rule. Rather
than a no-proxy-access default, they create a complicated rule whereby
shareholders holding enough shares can nominate a certain number of
directors but not a majority." They do not allow corporations to opt out of
this default rule in a way that restricts proxy access further than the new
default, but they allow opting out in the direction of easier access.
I argue that this new situation is still not optimal, though it is an
improvement. Two powerful values suggest shareholders should have a
significant say in electing directors and setting corporate governance rules.
One value is accountability. Directors and officers are supposed to act on
behalf of shareholders but are in many ways tempted to act in their own
interests. Many market mechanisms help counteract these temptations but
quite imperfectly. The board election mechanism is one of the most
fundamental forms of accountability, and proxy access simply works to
make that mechanism more of a reality than a convenient fiction. If any
form of increased accountability is defensible, this is it.
The other powerful value supporting change is freedom of contract. A
key virtue of American corporate law is its flexibility-that is, it allows
corporations to tailor rules to their own circumstances and preferences."
Accordingly, most rules are default rules and corporations can opt out of
these rules. This allows for experimentation, as we observe what rules work
best in different corporations. It also allows for tailoring to the needs of
differing corporations. A key question, that is under-analyzed, then
becomes how easy we make it for corporations to opt out of these default
rules. If we really value private ordering, we should make it easy for
shareholders to opt out of the prevailing default rules if they so choose. The
new system makes it easy for shareholders to opt for more generous proxy
access rules, but they cannot choose more stringent rules.
15. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9,136,
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg.
56,668, 56,675 (Aug. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Adopting Release] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a- 11).
16. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1-15 (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
48 (1993).
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The optimal default rule would allow for proxy access under relatively
generous conditions. Such proxy access would promote accountability
while only very weakly limiting appropriate board authority. Boards can act
much more cheaply and quickly than shareholders-after all, there are only
about a dozen directors, and thousands of shareholders. Therefore, if a pro-
shareholder default is inefficient, the board is likely to act quickly to change
it, whereas if a pro-board default is inefficient, shareholders are much less
likely to act to reverse it.17 A proxy access default rule also fits well with
the role of corporate law as a transaction-cost minimizing set of defaults.
Corporations that want to opt for no proxy access can easily structure such a
rule on their own. However, a proxy access regime is somewhat
complicated, involving choice over a number of dimensions-threshold
shareholder level for nominating shareholders, time length those shares
must have been held, how many directors shareholders may nominate, the
disclosure required, and so on. A proxy access default regime can make
these complicated decisions, avoiding the need for each corporation to do
so. Even where a corporation may choose to opt out of the default regime
on some dimensions, it may do so in only one or two ways with a short
provision, trusting to the statutory default on other rules.
As for the optimal altering rule, it would allow shareholders (not boards)
to opt out of the statutory default in any way that the shareholders choose.
Boards could opt out in favor of a rule allowing shareholders greater access
but not less access. The core value of freedom of contract supports this
altering rule. Even if the relevant default rule-setter makes a good guess as
to the optimal set of rules, it may well guess wrong. Even if it guesses well
for the typical corporation, the default rules may not be best for all
corporations, and individual tailoring may thus be called for.
Many similar arguments apply in considering both the default and the
altering rule. Advocates of limited shareholder power tend to back both a
default rule of no access and an altering rule in which shareholders alone
cannot opt out of that default. Advocates of expansive shareholder power
tend to back both a default rule of generous proxy access and an altering
rule in which shareholders can at low cost enact bylaws which opt out of
that default in any direction they please.' 8 This raises the question of
whether any other mix of default and altering rules is internally consistent.
This paper considers that question, concluding that other combinations are
defensible but not easily so.
17. See infra notes 255-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
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We also must consider the proper interplay of state and federal law in
setting the default and altering rules for proxy access. In part this is because
both levels of law are involved in setting these rules. More importantly, the
appropriate mix of state and federal law is very much a part of the debate
over the optimal rules in this area. A leading argument of opponents of the
SEC's new rules is that the SEC is intervening in an area where state law is
likely to lead to an optimal outcome.19
However, significant federal intervention in this area is justified. The two
values of accountability and freedom of contract also play out in achieving
a proper balance of federal and state rulemaking in this area.20 We achieve
freedom and flexibility by allowing corporations to choose whose state law
will govern them. This carries some risk and the reality of a managerialist
bent in state law (that is, state law goes too far in defending the interests of
managers). To maintain adequate accountability, federal actors (the SEC,
Congress, and federal courts) stand by to supplement or preempt state law
when the states, especially Delaware, have gone too far in favoring
managers over shareholders. In the case of proxy access, state law exhibits
both its normal, desirable flexibility but also its tendency to be too
managerial. In particular, the state law no-proxy-access default rule is hard
to defend.2 1 Thus, some intervention from the SEC is appropriate. The SEC
gets that intervention fairly right, but it is too rigid. The new default rule of
proxy access under certain conditions is well justified. However, the rules
should allow shareholders to opt out of this default in any way a majority of
them choose.
In this article, my argument proceeds as follows. Part II provides some
historical and legal background. Part III develops the basic policy
arguments. Part IV surveys recent developments in Delaware, especially the
CA, Inc. case. Part V explores recent developments at the federal level,
particularly the new proxy access rules. Part VI sorts out where Delaware
and the SEC have got it right, and where they have got it wrong. Delaware
is appropriately flexible but has the wrong default rule; the SEC's new rules
have the right default rule but too little flexibility.
19. See discussion infra Part V; see also note 8 and accompanying text.
20. Brett H. McDonnell, Recent Skirmishes in the Battle Over Corporate Voting and
Governance, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 349, 352-55 (2007) [hereinafter McDonnell, Recent
Skirmishes]; Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L.
99, 100 (2004) [hereinafter McDonnell, Two Cheers].
21. See infra Part VI.A.
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II. BACKGROUND
Shareholders elect directors-that is the rule for American corporations.
For large public corporations with no controlling shareholder, most
shareholders do not actually show up in person to vote for directors.
Instead, if they vote at all, they do so by filling out proxy cards that appoint
someone else as their proxy to go to the meeting and vote for them, with
directions as to how to vote. State law creates the basic mechanics for the
proxy system, but federal securities law heavily regulates proxy
solicitations in public corporations. As a result of both the dispersed
shareholder base of U.S. public corporations and the extensive federal
regulation of proxy solicitations, it turns out to be extremely expensive to
solicit proxies, often on the order of hundreds of thousands of dollars.2 2
A. The Default Rule
As a result, most shareholders will not choose to engage in proxy
solicitations on their own. This has proved crucial in the system of electing
directors. State law generally gives shareholders power to nominate
candidates for directors.23 However, state law is silent24 on the question of
whether company proxy material must include shareholder nominees. Given
that silence, nothing in state law forces boards to include shareholder
nominees. Thus, the default state law rule is that boards are not required to
do so; the decision of whether or not to include shareholder nominees in the
corporate proxy falls into the great grant of discretionary power to boards.
Federal securities law was until very recently also silent on this point,
despite extensive regulation of the proxy solicitation process. Proposals to
require proxy access under some circumstances have been around for a long
22. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675,
688-91 (2007).
23. The statutory basis for this power in Delaware is a bit murky, but Delaware courts
have recognized its existence and importance:
[T]he unadorned right to cast a ballot in a contest for [corporate] office ... is
meaningless without the right to participate in selecting the contestants. As
the nominating process circumscribes the range of choice to be made, it is a
fundamental and outcome-determinative step in the election of officeholders.
To allow for voting while maintaining a closed selection process thus renders
the former an empty exercise.
Harrah's Entm't, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 311 (Del. Ch. 2002) (alteration in
original) (quoting Durkin v. Nat'l Bank of Olyphant, 772 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also
Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future ofShareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1263 (2009).
24. Except in North Dakota, see infra note 237 and accompanying text.
43:0067] 73
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time. The SEC considered the issue as long ago as 1942.25 Most recently, in
200326 and 200727 the SEC published proposed rule changes that would
have allowed for proxy access under certain circumstances. In 2010, the
SEC finally adopted new rules, although it then suspended those rules
pending judicial resolution of a lawsuit challenging their validity. 28 The new
rules make some degree of proxy access the default rule for all corporations
subject to the SEC's proxy rules. The main conditions governing access
under the new default rule are:
* The nominating shareholders must hold at least three percent
of the outstanding shares;
* They must have held that amount of shares for at least three
years; and
* Shareholders can use the proxy to nominate only up to one
director or twenty-five percent of the board, whichever is
greater.29
The new rules are discussed more below in Part V.
B. The Altering Rules
1. State Law
Given the prior lack of proxy access as a default matter under both state
and federal law, shareholders have attempted to change the rules within
individual corporations. The lone way to do this, without board approval, is
to amend the bylaws. This, in turn, raises issues under both state and federal
law. Under state law, the question is how far the scope of the bylaw power
extends. Under federal law, the question is whether shareholder bylaw
proposals may be excluded under Rule 14a-8.
25. Securities Act Release No. 2,887, Exchange Act Release No. 3,347, Investment
Company Act Release No. 417, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,653 passim (Dec. 18, 1942), available at 1942
WL 34864.
26. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, passim (Oct. 14, 2003).
27. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, passim (July 27, 2007).
28. Adopting Relase, supra note 15; Order Granting Stay, Securities Act Release No.
9,149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010
SEC LEXIS 3275 passim (Oct. 4, 2010).
29. Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 56,675-76.
[ Ariz. St. L.J.74
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The question of how far the power of shareholders to enact bylaws
extends has been gathering steam for the last decade.30 One wonders why it
has taken so long for the Delaware courts to actually confront the question.
After all, for a very long time amending the bylaws has been the one
general power that shareholders have. Shareholders, of course, have long
had the right to vote for directors," but in public corporations that right has
long been weak outside the context of a hostile takeover, as incumbent
boards have dominated the mechanism for nominating and electing
directors.32 Shareholders also have long had the right to vote on certain
fundamental changes-certificate amendments," mergers,34 sales of
substantially all assets," dissolution 3 -but in each case only if the board
approved the change first. About the only thing that shareholders could do
on their own without boards acting first was amending the bylaws.3 7 If
shareholders wanted to act to constrain boards, then, it would seem like the
bylaws were an obvious place to look. If shareholders had been actively
using the bylaw power before recently, then the Delaware courts would
have had to decide how far that power extended long before now.
And yet that did not happen. CA, Inc. was only decided in 2008.8 Before
that decision there was some guidance in the case law as to the extent of
shareholder power, but that guidance was fragmentary and limited. Why
have courts only come to focus their attention on this question now?
Until recent decades, shareholders generally did not try to rally
campaigns to influence boards. For one thing, boards did not really matter
much. In the days of the managerialist firm,3 9 the CEO was king, and the
board was a council of advisors that got little attention from shareholders,
executives, economists, legal scholars, or pretty much anyone. Why bother
putting together an expensive campaign to influence such a trivial body?
The legal reality was that the board was the locus of power to control the
corporation, but the actual reality was quite different.
Moreover, shareholders relied on the Wall Street rule: if you were
unhappy with a company's policies or behavior, do not buy its shares, or if
30. See Fairfax, supra note 23, at 1275-78.
31. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32. See Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 680-81.
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
34. Id. § 251.
35. Id. § 271.
36. Id. § 275.
37. Id. § 109.
38. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 227 (Del. 2008).
39. CHESTER 1. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938) is the classic book
on managerialism, i.e., the dominance of corporations by their managers.
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you have already done so, then sell them.40 That was easier and cheaper
than trying to solicit proxies in a campaign to unseat or constrain the board.
Well-known collective action problems led to shareholder inaction.4 1 The
hope and claim was that various mechanisms, including the Wall Street rule
itself, would limit board and officer misbehavior.4 2
Certain shareholders became more active in the seventies and eighties
with the rise of hostile takeovers. A complex chess game between raiders
and incumbent boards developed, and the Delaware courts stepped in
repeatedly to define the rules of the game.43 However, bylaws ultimately
only played a relatively small role in that particular game, and then mostly
in the form of board-enacted bylaws used as defensive measures." In the
great takeover wave of the eighties, then, we got little new guidance as to
the extent of the power of shareholders to enact bylaws.
The hostile takeover wave gradually receded as boards figured out
effective defense measures and state courts and legislatures allowed them to
use those measures. A new sort of shareholder activism arose, tied to the
rise of institutional investors. Certain public employee and union pension
funds in particular began to use the Rule 14a-8 mechanism to make
shareholder proposals at low cost. 45 At first, most of the proposals were
merely advisory, as the SEC's rules encourage advisory proposals.4 6
However, boards could simply ignore such proposals if passed by the
shareholders. Shareholders faced with a recalcitrant board could not very
well rely on advisory proposals as an effective stick. And so, shareholder
activists turned to proposing amendments to the bylaws.
Shareholder bylaw proposals cover a wide range of topics. Perhaps the
most important proposals in the first wave were poison pill bylaws. Taking
a variety of forms, these poison pill bylaws attempted to limit the ability of
boards to adopt or keep in place poison pills. The first major scholarly
examinations of the shareholder bylaw power focused especially on poison
pill bylaws.4 ' The Oklahoma Supreme Court, applying statutory language
40. See supra note 1.
41. SeesupraPartI.
42. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 351-52 (1976).
43. See generally Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(discussing relevant Deleware precedent).
44. Id. at 652-57.
45. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018, 1043-46 (1998).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2011) (see note to this paragraph).
47. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder
Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 Bus. LAW. 1323 (2001); Coffee, supra note 12; Jeffrey
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very similar to that of the Delaware Code, found that such a poison pill
bylaw was valid under Oklahoma law,4 8 however, there was much doubt
whether Delaware courts would follow this logic. 49
More recently, a major focus of shareholder bylaw proposals has been on
the process of electing directors. Activist shareholders have proposed
bylaws that would allow shareholders under certain circumstances to
nominate directors using the corporate proxy ("proxy access proposals"),so
bylaws that would require a majority vote to elect directors,s" and bylaws
that would compensate shareholders for the expenses of a proxy contest if
they succeed in electing a director.52
These bylaw proposals raise complicated questions under both state and
federal law. In the last few years, the Delaware courts, the Delaware
legislature, federal courts, and the SEC have begun to consider these
questions.
At the state level, the leading question is the scope of what bylaws can
do. State law has a variety of specific provisions, but the general scope of
valid bylaws is defined in a very murky way. In Delaware, there is a serious
tension between section 109(b),53 which seems to define a broad scope for
the shareholder bylaw power, and section 141(a),5 4 which sets a broad scope
for the intrinsic power of boards. Although scholars have been discussing
this tension for a while, the Delaware courts have largely avoided
addressing the question until the CA, Inc. decision in 2008. Several recent
statutory amendments also address the question." Essentially, shareholders
now (post-CA, Inc.) have the broad power to enact "procedural" bylaws,
although they need to include fiduciary out provisions in those bylaws so
that boards are not required by a bylaw to violate their fiduciary duty. A
lesser, but still important, state law question is whether boards may amend
or repeal shareholder-enacted bylaws. This question remains unanswered in
Delaware, although a recent statutory amendment provides the answer for a
N. Gordon, "Just Say Never? " Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws:
An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDozO L. REv. 511 (1997); Hamermesh, supra note 12.
48. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907, 912-13 (Okla.
1999).
49. See Hamermesh, supra note 12, at 422-24.
50. The is the sort of bylaw at issue in Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Emps.
Pension Plan v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 122-23, 124 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006).
51. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors, 40 CONN. L. REv. 459, 494-96 (2007).
52. The is the sort of bylaw at issue in CA, Inc. v. AFSCMIE Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d
227, 229-30 (Del. 2008).
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
55. See infra Part IV.D.
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limited class of bylaws.5 6 Part IV of this essay discusses these state law
developments.
2. Federal Law
At the federal level, the main issue is what sorts of shareholder bylaw
proposals may be excluded under Rule 14a-8. A shareholder who submits a
proposal to the board is entitled to have that proposal submitted to a
shareholder vote within the corporation's proxy material (saving the
shareholder the huge costs of a separate proxy solicitation), as long as the
shareholder conforms to a few non-strenuous procedural requirements.5 7
However, the corporation may choose to exclude the shareholder proposal if
that proposal falls within one of an enumerated category of excludable
topics.51
Several bases for exclusion are of particular relevance to our topic. One
basis for exclusion is that the proposal is improper under state law. 59 This
refers back to the state law controversy as to what bylaws are valid. Under a
new procedure, the SEC can certify an uncertain state law question to the
Delaware Supreme Court and have that court decide whether a proposed
bylaw is valid under Delaware law.6 0 That is how the CA, Inc. case was
decided.6 1 A second basis for omission is if the proposal would violate a
state, federal, or foreign law.62 As we shall see, this basis turned out to be
important in the CA, Inc. case. A third basis for excluding a proposal is if
the proposal deals with "a matter relating to the company's ordinary
business operations."'
For shareholder access proposals, the biggest hurdle in Rule 14a-8 was,
until very recently, the "relates to an election" basis for exclusion.6 5 For
many years the SEC interpreted this provision as allowing boards to exclude
shareholder access proposals. In 2006, the Second Circuit disputed that
interpretation. In response, the SEC considered two quite different
56. See infra notes 195-96 and acompanying text.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)-(f) (2011).
58. Id. § 240.14a-8(i).
59. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
60. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
61. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 299 & n.1 (Del. 2008).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(2).
63. See infra Part IV.C.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
65. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(8).
66. See Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Emps. Pension Plan v. Am. Int'l Grp.,
Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2006).
67. Id. at 129-31.
78 [Ariz. St. L.J.
OPTIM4L RULES FOR PROXY A CCESS
potential changes to the language of the exclusion.68 In the end, it adopted
language that reinforced its old interpretation allowing for exclusion. 69 With
new Commission appointees under the Obama administration, the SEC
revised the relates to an election exclusion completely. Rule 14a-8 was
amended to drastically narrow the exclusion. So now, bylaw proposals
which would create a proxy access regime more generous than that under
Rule 14a-1 1 are not excludable on this basis. But, shareholders are not
allowed to enact bylaws which make proxy access available on more stingy
terms than 14a- 11 7o Part V discusses these developments in detail. A major
thesis of this article is that the revisions to Rule 14a-8 are an improvement
to the status quo but that a better approach would allow shareholders more
choice in deciding what proxy access regime should cover individual
companies.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
We must consider both the desirable default rules and the desirable
altering rules for shareholder voting for the board. The question as to the
default rule is whether companies, in the absence of a company-specific rule
to the contrary, should allow shareholders to nominate director candidates
using the company's proxy material. The question as to the altering rule is
how companies should be able to opt out of that default rule.
A. The Default Rule
There are a variety of approaches to deciding what default rules are
optimal. The majoritarian approach asks what the shareholders in a majority
of companies would choose if they could at no cost consider the matter and
make a choice for themselves.7' Of course, it is easier to state that approach
than to actually apply it in many concrete cases. Would shareholders in a
majority of companies choose the prevailing default rule today, namely no
proxy access?
I will consider that question in more detail in Part VI below. But first,
consider the broad policy considerations in favor of and opposing a default
68. See generally Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange
Act Release No. 56,161, 91 SEC Docket 575 (July 27, 2007); Shareholder Proposals, Exchange
Act Release No. 56,160, 91 SEC Docket 544 (July 27, 2007).
69. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release
No. 56,914, 92 SEC Docket 256 (Dec. 6, 2007).
70. Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 56,669-77.
71. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, 92-94.
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rule that provides for some proxy access. The leading broad value favoring
proxy access is accountability. At least since Berle and Means, the core
problem of corporate law has been understood as how to discipline
managers to act in the best interests of shareholders given the separation of
ownership and control that occurs in public corporations with dispersed
shareholdings.72 We understand managers as agents who are supposed to act
in the best interests of their shareholders." Shareholder voting for directors
is one of the few direct accountability mechanisms that shareholders have to
keep their agents in line. Lucian Bebchuk has made the compelling
empirical and normative case that this mechanism is currently too weak and
needs strengthening.74 Currently, shareholders act as mere rubber stamps for
unopposed board nominees. Proxy access is one of the best available ways
to strengthen shareholder voting for directors.
Are there major countervailing policy considerations? Opponents of
proxy access argue that it will result in high costs for several reasons. One
problem is the out-of-pocket costs involved in responding to shareholder
nominations. 76 However, these are not likely to be large relative to the
existing costs of crafting a proxy statement disclosure.77 Of more
significance is the likely diversion of director and officer time and
attention." Nonetheless, unless one has good reason to distrust shareholder
votes in contested elections, this diversion is likely to be significant only in
cases where there is a real chance that board nominees will lose. These
cases will only arise where the board is not performing well-thus, getting
the attention of the directors in those cases is not such a bad thing.
Proxy access is likely to be unduly costly only if we think there is a high
chance that shareholders will be at risk of getting their own best interests
wrong in elections pitting board nominees against shareholder nominees.
Why might that be so? It could happen either due to pervasive shareholder
lack of information or because many shareholders are deliberately going
against shareholder interests. There are well known reasons why
shareholders are rationally ignorant about what goes on within public
72. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 112-18 (1932).
73. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42, at 309.
74. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 833, 850-61 (2005).
75. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65
Bus. LAW. 330, 335-37 (2010).
76. Id.
77. Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 56,768-70.
78. Id at 56,765.
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corporations. Still, shareholders should be aware of their own ignorance
vis-Ai-vis the board, and hence be prone to defer to the board. And normally
they do just that. The shareholders more likely to vote are institutional
shareholders and they are more likely to be informed. Shareholders are
likely to put aside their normal deference in cases where significant
evidence suggests a board is not doing its job well-which is when we want
shareholders to become more involved.
If simple shareholder ignorance, though common, is unlikely to lead to
systematic anti-board bias when not appropriate, then some shareholders
may be attempting to use proxy access deliberately to promote their own
interests at the expense of other shareholders. A leading argument is that
insidious special interest shareholders will usurp expanded shareholder
power to their own nefarious ends. The main targets of this fear are union
pension and public employee funds." These are indeed typically the most
activist of the institutional investors, although some hedge funds have
become increasingly active as well." However, it is not clear that union and
public employee funds operate against the interest of other shareholders.
Their greater activism may be explained by the fact that they face less
competition, and hence their managers are more willing to incur the costs of
shareholder activism.8 2 A key limitation is that shareholder activists must
achieve a majority vote of all shareholders to succeed. They are likely to
succeed only if they are promoting a slate or position where their interests
mesh with the interests of other shareholders.8 Steve Bainbridge has
presented some scenarios in which special interest shareholders might
nonetheless be able to decrease shareholder value despite this majoritarian
constraint.84 My argument is that these scenarios are not plausibly of first-
order importance.
Joseph Grundfest suggests a variant of this argument with his notion of
"megaphone externalities." The idea is that union and state pension fund
managers can benefit from the publicity they will achieve by running board
79. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 82-83.
80. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751-57 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment];
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
795, 814-20 (1993).
81. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029-30 (2007).
82. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 5, at 243.
83. Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 885.
84. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 80, at 1756-57.
85. Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of the
New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 177-78 (2009)
[hereinafter McDonnell, Arrowian Moment].
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candidates even where their chances of success are slim. 86 There is
presumably something to this, but I think there is not enough to present a
strong argument against proxy access. Once the novelty has worn off, are
shareholder activists really going to get that much press coverage when they
run obviously quixotic campaigns for boards? If they have a real chance of
success, coverage is more likely, but once again, those are the
circumstances where we want incumbent boards to sweat. Moreover,
shareholder activists can already use Rule 14a-8 proposals to draw attention
to issues that concern them-why will the megaphone be much louder for
board contests with little to no chance of success?
A broader argument against a strong shareholder power is that the board
is the appropriate focus of authority in a corporation. It is clearly true that in
a large public corporation with a dispersed shareholder base, informational
considerations alone undoubtedly disable shareholders from making most
operational decisions. The default rules of corporate law make obvious
good sense in putting managerial decisions in the hands of the board (which
can and does delegate most decisionmaking to the officers). Steve
Bainbridge has constructed the most elaborate arguments in favor of strong
limits on the ability of shareholders to be involved in running
corporations." Bainbridge draws heavily upon work by Kenneth Arrow" in
arguing that accountability mechanisms go too far in undermining board
authority." Centralizing authority in a board avoids high costs involved in
decisionmaking by poorly-informed, dispersed shareholders. Mechanisms
which allow shareholders to second guess board decisions undo the gains of
centralization by in effect eliminating board authority-if shareholders can
second guess the board, then the board is not in fact the final
decisionmaker.9 0
However, I have shown in a prior article that Bainbridge's logic does not
extend as far as he suggests." His argument is particularly weak against
proxy access. Shareholder voting for directors is the most defensible form
86. Joseph Grundfest, The SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and
the Law, 65 Bus. LAW. 361, 365 (2010).
87. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Means and
Ends]; STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2008) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
88. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974).
89. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 87; BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 87.
90. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 80, at 1747 (quoting ARROW,
supra note 88, at 78).
91. McDonnell, Arrowian Moment, supra note 85, at 162-85.
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of accountability under his core Arrowian argument. That argument
repeatedly stresses that accountability mechanisms should function only
intermittently and not be used to review detailed ongoing decisions.92
Voting for directors operates precisely in that way. Voting is only on board
nominees, not specific policy decisions, and it happens only once a year.
Proxy access simply makes this limited form of accountability work as an
actual measure of accountability, rather than a mere rubberstamp. If any sort
of accountability measure is justified at all, this is.
There is an alternative approach to majoritarianism in defining optimal
default rules within corporate law. Bebchuk and Hamdani suggest setting
default rules in a way that favors shareholders. If that is indeed the optimal
default for a particular corporation, it will remain. If not, it is easier for
boards to opt out of a pro-shareholder rule than for shareholders to opt out
of a pro-board rule. Thus, setting the default with a pro-shareholder rule is
more likely to lead to an optimal final choice of rule.93 This approach
clearly favors a default rule that allows for some proxy access.94
Perhaps the best argument against increased shareholder power (in either
the default or the altering rule) flows from a stakeholder approach to the
corporation. So far, I have assumed that corporations should be governed in
the best interests of their shareholders. That is the dominant assumption in
American corporate law and legal scholarship, but it is contested.95 One
might instead believe that the corporation should be run in the interests of a
variety of constituencies, including at least creditors, employees, and
shareholders. 16 In that case, shifting power to shareholders could be
threatening to other constituencies. One might defend leaving boards strong
at the expense of shareholders to protect other constituencies, with the
board acting as a mediator which reflects the interests of several groups.9 7
Here, we have a multi-party game with interactions between
shareholders, creditors, employees, officers, and directors." The question
92. Id. at 163-64.
93. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 489, 492 (2002).
94. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 75, at 350.
95. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 16 (2006).
96. Id. I myself believe this. See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics
Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 334, 341-42 (2008).
97. This is the core of the team production model of the firm. See Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 280-81
(1999). See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S
NEWEST EXPORT (2001).
98. John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player
Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1496 (1990).
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is, are creditors and employees better off with a strong board looking after
their interests? Or do they have enough shared interests with shareholders as
against the board and officers that they would be better off if shareholders
had expanded rights to hold the directors and officers more accountable?
This is a tough question. On some matters, creditors and employees would
appear to have interests aligned with shareholders, and on other matters not,
and creditors and employees themselves may not always agree.
It is very hard to answer this question in the abstract, and it probably
varies among corporations. As far as employees are concerned, it appears
that the leading organized employee interest groups have opted in favor of
espousing greater shareholder power.9 9 Recall that union pension funds are
among the leading shareholder activists. In the context of a shareholder
primacy model,'o this is problematic, since employees may have interests
that differ from those of shareholders. It also gives rise to an argument
against an expansive shareholder bylaw power, although we have seen that
this argument is not conclusive.'o' However, in the context of a stakeholder
modell'02 in which representation of employee interests is a good thing,
those union pension funds are a welcome sight. The unions seem to have
decided that the tools of shareholder activism are a good way to advance
their members' interests. That in turn suggests that we should not oppose
increased shareholder power out of a concern for other corporate
constituencies, at least not the employee constituency. A similar point
applies to Grundfest's argument concerning megaphone externalities.'03
This stakeholder argument in favor of increased shareholder power may
seem in some tension with my earlier argument that pension fund activists
are not special interests going against the interests of other shareholders.'0 4
But the two arguments are consistent. Sometimes employee and shareholder
interests will converge, and sometimes they will diverge. Given the
distribution of shareholders in most public corporations, pension funds are
likely to succeed in an initiative only when they can get the votes of many
other shareholders. Thus, even if we believe that pension funds tend to think
about the interests of labor as well as the value of their shares (and I suspect
that is so), they are likely to pursue only those challenges to management
where these two interests come together. From the point of view of
99. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 5, at 250.
100. For the belief that corporations should serve shareholder interests, subject to ultimate
shareholder authority, see Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975, 977-82 (2006).
101. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
102. See Bodie, supra note 100, at 977-82.
103. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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shareholders generally, it is good to have such activists willing to challenge
management, so long as other shareholders get to vote on what the activists
propose. From the point of view of employees, although the pension fund
activism route is severely limited by the need to concentrate only on issues
where employee and shareholder interests converge, it is better than no
power at all.
B. The Altering Rule
At issue in the ongoing legal developments surrounding proxy access is
not just the appropriate default rule (should shareholders be able to put their
nominees in the company's proxy statement?), but also the appropriate
altering rule (should shareholders be able to change the default rule through
a bylaw amendment?), and how easy should we make it for them to do that?
Importantly, the valid scope of shareholder bylaws structures the "altering
rules" of corporate law.105 Most of state corporate law consists of default
rules, which individual companies can alter to fit their own
circumstances. 106 An important and under-studied topic is how the law
structures the process for opting out of various default rules-the rules
governing this process are corporate law's altering rules. How easy is it for
a company to opt out, and who has the authority to do so? 10' If a company
must opt out in the charter, that requires both shareholder and board
approval, whereas opting out in the bylaws requires approval by only
shareholders or the board.' An altering rule which allows for altering
through the bylaws is easier-less sticky-than a rule which requires
altering through the charter, and it also changes the authority structure,
although in an ambiguous way because the shareholders and the board can
each act on their own to amend the bylaws.' 09
Two core guiding principles of American corporate law-accountability
and freedom of contract-strongly favor un-sticky altering rules that give
wide latitude to shareholders to set the basic rules of corporate governance
within a company. We shall see that both of these principles justify a
change from the status quo altering rule. However, they do not completely
agree as to what that change should look like-this disagreement helps
make sense of the competing considerations in the changes to Rule 14a-8.
105. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults, supra note 10, at 402-06.
106. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16.
107. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults, supra note 10, at 402-06.
108. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 109(a) (West 2010), with § 241(b) (West 2010).
109. Occasionally the law allows opting out only through a shareholder-enacted bylaw, not
a board-enacted bylaw, but that is rare. See McDonnell, Sticky Defaults, supra note 10, at 405.
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American state corporate law, and scholarship concerning that law,
embodies a strong respect for freedom of contract. Companies have a wide
range of choice in what rules they want to govern their internal relations.
They can choose from a variety of forms of legal entities, given the choice
of incorporation they can choose in which state to incorporate, and once
they have chosen a state of incorporation they can tailor most legal
provisions to suit their own circumstances. Most American corporate law
scholars have defended this structure on the grounds that markets will
operate to defend against most possible abuses of the corporate forms, so
that rules and procedures which do not adequately protect shareholders will
lose out in the competitive market.o This type of argument mainly has
been used to defend using default rather than mandatory rules, but the logic
also favors altering rules that make change easy compared to sticky altering
rules. 1
We have already considered the other major guiding principle favoring
more shareholder power in setting rules through bylaws, namely the
understanding of the relationship between shareholders and managers
(officers and directors) as an agency relationship. Given that understanding,
it makes obvious sense to argue that the principals should be able to
structure basic governance relationships in a way that they believe will best
induce their agents to act in their interests. This also supports the argument
for some change in the status quo, so that shareholders are given more
power to set the basic rules of the game through the bylaws and to
effectively choose who will manage their companies.
Are there any valid counter-arguments favoring a limited shareholder
bylaw power?"12 We have considered the argument that ignorant
shareholders will make too many mistakes. We found this argument
wanting with respect to voting on board nominees. Is the argument any
more plausible when one comes to voting on the rules governing proxy
access? That is an interesting question. One could argue it either way.
Perhaps shareholders are better at making general corporate governance
decisions like setting proxy access rules. This argument would be a defense
of the widespread position adopted in response to the SEC's new rules,
which argues that the default rule should be no proxy access, but that
shareholders should be allowed to vote for bylaws granting more access.13
On the other hand, perhaps institutional activists are in a better position to
110. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16; ROMANO, supra note 16.
111. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults, supra note 10, at 396-97.
112. For more extended discussion of the policy considerations surrounding the shareholder
bylaw power, see McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 5, at 235-52.
113. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 86, at 362.
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judge the abilities of persons they nominate to the board, and to evaluate the
performance of an incumbent board, than they are to figure out the best
proxy access rules for differing corporations. After all, state corporate law
traditionally does give shareholders the power to vote on directors and very
little else-perhaps that involves a recognition that this is the matter on
which shareholders are best placed to vote on. To my knowledge, no one
yet has made a good argument for shareholders being in a better position to
make one of these kinds of decisions than the other. We also already have
considered the argument that special interest shareholders will hijack
measures increasing shareholder power and found it wanting.114
The more fundamental objection stems from Bainbridge's argument for
director primacy."' We have seen that Bainbridge's argument does not
work against adjustments to the mechanism of board elections, but is it
stronger as applied to bylaw amendments? No. Bainbridge's logic may
support rules that ban shareholders from making ordinary business
decisions, but it does not support rules that ban shareholders from setting
rules that shape the structure of a company's governance and procedures."'
As we shall see, that distinction between business decisions versus
governance and procedural rules tracks quite nicely the legal limits for the
bylaw power.
Thus, the principle of contractual freedom and the goal of constraining
director and officer misbehavior both favor an altering rule which allows
shareholders to choose their preferred proxy access regime, and the latter
also favors a default rule favoring proxy access in board elections. There are
some counter-arguments, but in the end these central principles of corporate
law do seem to point in the same direction.
The similarity in many of the arguments surrounding the optimal default
rule and the optimal altering rule suggest a possible linkage. Many
arguments against shareholder power, which I have considered, suggest
both a default rule of no proxy access and an altering rule in which
shareholders cannot act on their own to change that rule. And indeed, we do
often find these positions linked. Bainbridge is perhaps the purest academic
proponent of those positions, and corporate directors and officers and the
interest groups that tend to side with them have traditionally argued for both
positions (although as we shall see, in response to the SEC's 2009 proposal
which led to the new rules," 7 many of these groups have now given ground
114. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
115. See generally Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 87.
116. McDonnell, Arrowian Moment, supra note 85, at 164-65.
117. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9,046,
Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74 Fed. Reg.
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on the altering rule, but that is probably a recognition of a changed political
reality in which they need to compromise). Many arguments for shareholder
power considered above suggest both a default rule of generous proxy
access and an altering rule in which shareholders are able to set the rules
themselves. Here too, we often find these positions linked. Bebchuk is
probably the leading academic proponent, and shareholder activist groups
have tended to take both positions as well (although where they seem on the
verge of getting a favorable default rule, they do have some tendency to
want to hard-wire that with an inflexible altering rule).
An interesting question then becomes whether there are plausible
arguments favoring shareholder power in the default rule but not the
altering rule or vice versa. As just noted, many defenders of board interests
are now taking such a position, arguing for no access as the default rule but
conceding that shareholders should be able to opt in to an access regime."'
I just suggested that current politics may explain that, but is there an
intellectually consistent justification? Perhaps-the principle of freedom of
contract supports a non-sticky altering rule, but has less bite in considering
the default rule. Plus, perhaps shareholder ignorance is less pervasive in
choosing a general governance rule than in choosing between individual
director candidates. The opposite combination is also possible-the SEC
adopted a pro-access default rule with a hardened altering rule (at least in
one direction), and many shareholder advocates have embraced that rule."'
Perhaps this can be justified by a need to have minimal standards to protect
shareholders, but going beyond this floor should be allowed. Alternatively,
maybe shareholder ignorance is less pervasive in choosing between director
candidates than in choosing a general governance rule. So, all sorts of
combinations of default and altering rules can be argued for. Still, many of
the arguments do tend to hang together, either favoring or opposing
significant shareholder power in both the proxy access rule and in the
altering rule.
C. Federalism
Part of strengthening the shareholder bylaw power includes applying
Rule 14a-8 so that shareholders can use the Rule to propose bylaw changes.
Even if shareholders have the power to enact a bylaw under state law, if
they cannot use the corporate proxy materials to propose a bylaw, the costs
29,024 (June 10, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Proposal] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232,
240, 249 & 274).
118. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
119. See infra note 238.
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of engaging in their own proxy solicitation will usually make proposing a
bylaw prohibitively expensive. In considering the effective altering rules for
corporate law, one must look to Rule 14a-8-a federal rule-as well as to
state law. Moreover, the SEC's new Rule 14a- 11 changes the default rule. A
leading argument by opponents of Rule 14a- 11 is that director elections are
a traditional subject for state law and that state law leads to optimal rules on
this matter. 12 0
Thus, the other important policy consideration that arises pervasively in
this debate is federalism and the role of state and federal governmental
actors in setting the relevant rules. There has been a long-running scholarly
debate as to whether corporate law rules should be set at the state or federal
levels. Advocates of the state level believe in a "race to the top," where
states compete to write rules that corporations and their shareholders find
attractive. 121 Advocates of the federal level believe in a "race to the
bottom," where states compete to offer management-friendly rules that do
not adequately protect shareholders, at least with respect to some legal
rules. 122
In prior writing, I have suggested an intermediate position. State-level
rules offer benefits of flexibility, experimentation, responsiveness, and the
creation of a highly expert and motivated body in the Delaware courts,
leading to higher-quality law than a purely national-level system would
produce. However, the dominant state (Delaware) also tends to be
somewhat biased in favor of managers over shareholders, because the board
plays the leading role in the choice of the state of incorporation. A mixed
state-federal system-in which the states set basic rules, but federal actors
sometimes intervene to set different rules where they think the state rules
are inadequate-offers many of the advantages of both a purely state and a
purely national system. Thus, the interaction between the state and federal
levels is crucial. 123
120. See, e.g., Letter from James L. Holzman, Chair, Council of the Corp. Law Section,
Del. State Bar Ass'n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC 5-6 (July 24, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf. This is apparently the first formal
comment letter that section has submitted to the SEC. Id. at 2.
121. Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 227-30 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory ofthe Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-255 (1977).
122. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allan Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor
State Competition in Corporation Law?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1775 (2002); William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
123. McDonnell, Two Cheers, supra note 20, at 138-40; McDonnell, Recent Skirmishes,
supra note 20, at 352-54; Brett H. McDonnell, Delaware, Federalism and the Expertise-Bias
Tradeoff (Law & Econ. Workshop, Berkeley Program in Law and Econ., Univ. of Cal.
Berkeley, 2004), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8297dlrx?.
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Robert Ahdieh has also analyzed the state-federal interaction in this area
in a way that gives much insight.124 He calls for "dialectical regulation," in
which federal and state actors interact in a dynamic give and take as they
develop corporate law. 125 Rule 14a-8 provides an especially good venue for
such dialectical regulation. He calls for the SEC to give a greater role to
state courts in deciding what shareholder proposals should be excludable.
He sees the new Delaware procedure for certifying state law questions to
the Delaware Supreme Court as showing particular promise.126 As we shall
see, this procedure gave rise to the crucial CA, Inc. case. Ahdieh argues that
dialectical regulation would encourage innovation, provide better quality
control over the production of legal rules, and allow for participation in
rulemaking by a fuller range of interest groups.127
Thus, there is an important role for the SEC and federal rules in the area
of proxy access. Federal law has traditionally done more than state law to
help ensure protection of shareholder interests in the area of shareholder
voting,'2 8 perhaps in part because of the managerial bias of state law. As a
result of this history, states are not expected to legislate in this area.
Moreover, the costs imposed on shareholder activism by federal proxy rules
are a major part of the reason that something like Rule 14a-8 is needed.'
However, we should be wary of a complete federal takeover in this area that
imposes a mandatory, uniform rule on all public corporations. Such a rule
would cut off experimentation in an area where we really do not know for
sure what the best rules look like.
We now turn from general policy considerations to a review and analysis
of important recent state and federal developments in the area of
shareholder bylaws and proxy access. These policy considerations will
124. Robert B. Ahdieh, The Dialectical Regulation of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic
Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 165, 165, 169-68 (2007). See generally
Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP.
L. 625 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Robert B.
Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchanges: Challenges to the First State as First
in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779 (2004). Roe applies his influential model of
Delaware-federal interaction to the proxy access debate in a new working paper. Mark J. Roe,
The Corporate Shareholder's Vote and its Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington
(February 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
125. Ahdieh, supra note 124, at 165, 169-84.
126. Id. at 175.
127. Id. at 181-83. But see Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The
Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate 35-39 (Washington & Lee Legal
Studies, Paper No. 2010-12, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-1669282
(arguing that the certification process has distorted the decisionmaking of the Delaware court by
having it decide the issue before a bylaw is actually used in practice).
128. See Roe, supra note 124, at 612-14.
129. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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guide our understanding of how effective those developments are likely to
be.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN DELAWARE
Delaware is of course the leading American jurisdiction for public
corporations. Thus, its rules for proxy access and the scope of valid bylaws
are more important by far than the rules of any other state and quite
possibly more important than the rules of all other states combined.
Delaware courts consider dozens of corporate law cases every year;
ultimately, every major state-corporate-law question will make it to
Delaware. And yet, until very recently, there was little guidance as to the
general scope of the shareholder bylaw power in Delaware.
A. Default Rule
Delaware law provides the basic mechanics for shareholder meetings,
board elections, and the appointment of proxies to vote for absent
shareholders.130 Yet, it is largely silent on what companies must include in
proxy solicitations that it chooses to distribute, in part due to the traditional
dominance of the federal proxy rules in this area. Thus, nothing in Delaware
law says that shareholder nominees must be included in the corporate proxy
material. This silence has been, reasonably and rightly, interpreted to imply
that the question of what to include in that material is subject to the sound
discretion of the board under the vast grant of authority to the board under
section 141(a).'"' There has been no apparent movement to change this
default rule in Delaware. This also appears to be the default rule in most
other states, with North Dakota as an exception.'32
B. Altering Rule
There has been movement concerning the altering rule. Many provisions
in Delaware's corporate law provide that specific rules can be set within a
corporation's bylaws. For instance, the bylaws may set the size of the board
of directors"' or define the powers of officers. 3 4 For other sorts of rules,
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211-12 (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
131. Id. § 141(a).
132. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-35-08 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Regular Session)
(granting right to proxy access to shareholders holding over five percent of outstanding shares).
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(b) (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
134. Id. § 142(a).
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various specific provisions provide that the certificate of incorporation may
set the rule for a corporation, without mentioning the bylaws."' A strong
espressio unius argument implies that the bylaws may not be used to set
such rules. For instance, only the certificate may provide for shareholder
removal of directors on a classified board without cause"' or specify the
rights and powers of classes of shares.'37 For rules that are covered by such
a specific statutory provision, it is clear whether a bylaw may or may not set
the rule.138
However, many important shareholder bylaws are not covered, or at least
not clearly covered, by any such specific statutory provision. Proxy access
bylaws were, until recently, an important example (we shall see that a new
Delaware section does address, and validate, proxy access bylaws). Indeed,
nothing in Delaware law, until recently, specifically spoke to the issue of
proxy access. An important question thus becomes what Delaware law says
about the validity of bylaws where there is no specific statutory provision
on point.
There has been significant debate on this point in recent years. That
debate has centered on two general statutory provisions. Section 109 is the
basic provision providing for the existence of bylaws. Section 109(b) gives
the general scope for bylaws:
The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law
or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers
or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees. 1 39
This would seem to leave quite a broad residual scope for bylaws. But
commentators and courts have pointed to a different statutory provision
which limits this scope.'4 0 It is section 141(a), the core grant of authority to
the board of directors:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
135. See McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 5, at 220-21.
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1).
137. Id. § 151(a).
138. For a relatively comprehensive list of such specific statutory provisions in Delaware,
see McDonnell, Sticky Defaults, supra note 10, at 437-39.
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
140. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008);
Hamermesh, supra note 12, at 428-34.
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directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in
its certificate of incorporation. 141
Insofar as a bylaw operates to limit the discretion of the board (and what
bylaw does not?), it potentially runs afoul of section 141(a).
As I have noted before, there are three basic ways to attempt to reconcile
these three provisions:
First, section 109(b) does not on its own validate any sort of bylaw
provision, because section 141(a) always trumps it. Second,
section 141(a) does not provide any sort of limitation whatsoever
on the provisions that section 109(b) allows, because section
109(b) always trumps 141(a). Third, one can split the difference so
that section 109(b) does allow for some limitations on matters that
otherwise would be subject to board authority, but section 141(a)
limits how far such bylaw provisions can go. The question then
arises as to how to split the difference.142
Until 2008, no Delaware case ruled definitively on these competing
interpretations. Scholars took varying positions, as scholars are wont to do.
In probably the leading article, Larry Hamermesh took a position quite
close to the first above, that section 141(a) always trumps. 143 In his current
work in progress, Gordon Smith argues that the second position should
triumph, namely section 109(b) should always trump.'" John Coffee staked
out the third position, suggesting four possible distinctions to help split the
difference:
* Bylaws can regulate fundamental but not ordinary matters;
* Bylaws can act as negative constraints but may not
affirmatively order the board to take actions;
* Bylaws can regulate procedure but not substance; and
* Bylaws can regulate corporate governance but not business
decisions. 145
In my original piece on bylaws, I used detailed arguments based on
statutory text, legislative history, case law, and policy to defend the split-
the-difference position, with the last two of Coffee's distinctions providing
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (Westlaw).
142. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 5, at 214.
143. Hamermesh, supra note 12, at 428-34.
144. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew G. Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with
Shareholder Bylaws 9-14 (Mar. 26, 2011) (unpublished article), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1797066.
145. Coffee, supra note 12, at 613-14.
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guidance as to how to split the difference.146 In brief, a split-the-difference
approach gives some effect to all relevant language in both sections 141(a)
and 109(b), whereas the other two approaches must ignore some parts of the
statutes. As a matter of policy, an approach that subordinates 109(b) to
141(a) fails under considerations of both accountability and flexibility. As
for accountability, bylaws are the only way that shareholders can shape
governance mechanisms without gaining board approval. As for flexibility,
allowing shareholders to act without board approval allows for easier
adaptations to new or differing circumstances. On the other hand, an overly
broad shareholder power which gives shareholders unlimited power to
encroach upon operational decisions would go too far in contradicting the
core grant of authority to boards that is a central part of corporate law.
C. Altering Rule-CA, Inc.
Until 2008, there was only fleeting analysis of this problem in Delaware
case law.'47 That changed with the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME.14 8 The case arose through an important new procedure
that increases the chances for useful dialogue between the SEC and the
Delaware Supreme Court.'4 9 The AFSCME Employees Pension Plan
submitted a bylaw proposal under Rule 14a-8 to CA, Inc. The bylaw would
have required the corporation to reimburse shareholders for reasonable
expenses incurred in a successful proxy contest for board seats under certain
circumstances. Because such proposals are not excludable under the "relates
to an election" basis for exclusion,'s the issue boiled down to whether the
bylaw was a proper subject for shareholder action under state law or
otherwise violated Delaware law, the first two bases for exclusion in Rule
14a-8.1"
In the past, the SEC would have either analyzed the state law question
itself or else said it would not take a position on the state law question and
hence would not take a position on whether the proposal was excludable.'5 2
A new procedure in Delaware, however, allows the SEC to certify state law
questions such as these to the Delaware Supreme Court, which has
146. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 5, at 216-23.
147. For analysis of that case law, see id. at 230-35.
148. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
149. See Ahdieh, supra note 124, at 171-74.
150. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,469 (July 27, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240).
151. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1), (2) (2010).
152. See Bruner, supra note 127, at 30-31.
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discretion whether or not to accept and decide the question.1 3 This was the
first time the SEC certified a question to the Delaware court, and the court
accepted it. 154
The court answered the two questions certified to it by the SEC
separately. It first analyzed whether the proposed bylaw was a proper
subject for shareholder action under Delaware law."' This is where the
court, for the first time, gave a general answer to the tension between
sections 109(b) and 141(a) described above. The court first laid out the
statutory conundrum."' It then rejected CA's argument that any bylaw
which might in any way limit board power is not allowed under section
141(a), i.e., it rejected the first possible position described above, that
section 141(a) always trumps section 109(b).157 It noted that otherwise
shareholders could not adopt any bylaws, because all bylaws can be
characterized as in some way restricting board authority.5 '
The court then looked to specific statutes and case law in an attempt to
characterize what bylaws typically do.' It reasoned that "[i]t is well-
established Delaware law that a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate
how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but
rather, to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are
made."' Thus, the court accepted as critical the procedure/substance
distinction noted above as one of four possible ways one might distinguish
valid from invalid bylaws.
How far does this go in answering the question of what bylaws are valid?
It helps a lot. But one must note two important limits on the guidance
provided. First, the court says that setting procedure is "a proper function"
of bylaws (emphasis added). This leaves open the possibility that there may
be other proper functions. The court specifically emphasized that it was not
attempting to adopt with "doctrinal exactitude a bright line that divides
those bylaws that shareholders may unilaterally adopt under Section 109(b)
from those which they may not under Section 141(a)."' 6 ' Thus, it remains
possible that Delaware courts may use one or more of the other three
distinctions described above in deciding cases where the
procedure/substance distinction does not give a clear or satisfactory answer.
153. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8) (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
154. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 n.l (Del. 2008).
155. Id. at 231-37.
156. Id. at 232.
157. Id. at 234.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 234-35.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 234.
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Second, as the court noted, the procedure/substance distinction is not an
incredibly sharp bright line rule. Many matters will fall clearly on one or the
other side of that line, but for many other matters how to apply this
distinction will be reasonably disputed. Indeed, for the proxy expense
reimbursement bylaw at question in the case itself, it was not utterly clear
on which side of the line it fell. CA argued that because the bylaw ordered
the expenditure of corporate funds in specified circumstances, it was
substantive not procedural.'6 2 The court did not find this point dispositive.163
Instead, it characterized this bylaw (quite plausibly) as being about the
process for electing directors, which is "a subject in which shareholders of
Delaware corporations have a legitimate and protected interest."'" Thus, it
held that this bylaw was procedural and hence a valid subject for
shareholder action under Delaware law. 165
How might this rule be applied for other bylaws? Consider a few other
types of bylaws that are of current interest:
* Proxy access bylaws would clearly count as procedural
because they too are about the process for electing directors.
* Bylaws requiring a binding or non-binding shareholder vote
for setting director or officer compensation would seem valid
because they regulate the procedure for setting compensation.
* Bylaws setting limits on director or officer compensation look
less procedural. However, they may be valid as setting rules of
corporate governance or may be valid under specific statutory
provisions, such as section 141(h) for director
compensationl66 or section 142 for officers.167
* Bylaws splitting the positions of board chair and CEO may or
may not be procedural, and may also be justified either as
setting corporate governance rules or by more specific
statutory provisions such as section 142.168
162. Id. at 236.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 237.
165. Id.
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
167. Id. § 142.
168. Id.
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* Bylaws limiting the ability of boards to adopt or use poison
pills may be valid or not depending on exactly how they are
drafted. 169
Unfortunately for AFSCME, the court did not stop its analysis with the
conclusion that the reimbursement bylaw was a valid subject for
shareholder action. It went on to ask, in the highly unsatisfactory legal
analysis of Section IV of its opinion, whether the bylaw might otherwise
violate Delaware law.' 70 The court began this section by noting that it
confronted the bylaw before it had even been passed, not in litigation over
the application of the bylaw in particular circumstances."' It thus construed
its duty as asking whether there was "any possible circumstance""' under
which the bylaw might cause a violation of Delaware law. This is a very
harsh sort of facial validity analysis, and probably an unintended
consequence of the functioning of the new certification procedure. The
court need not have interpreted its question in this way; for instance, it
could have done what courts do in examining the facial constitutionality of
a statute. In that analysis, a statute's "overbreadth ... must not only be real,
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep."' 7 3 Such an approach would seem more in line with the traditional
presumption of validity that the courts extend to bylaws. 1' Christopher
Bruner argues that even under such an approach the court would probably
have still held the bylaw invalid. ' Perhaps, but I find it quite a stretch to
say there's really a broad range of circumstances in which a board's duty
would require it to not compensate successful shareholder nominees. That
said, I do agree with Bruner that given the approach the Delaware courts
have chosen to take in CA, Inc., it would be better for the SEC to not certify
issues to Delaware and instead simply refuse to issue a letter saying it will
take no action on the basis of the state law exclusion where there is
significant doubt as to the application of the state law.'76
169. I analyze these sorts of bylaws in more detail in McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws,
supra note 5. Matthew F. Sullivan, Shareholder Bylaw Proposals, Delaware Certification, and
the SEC After CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 193,
213-15 (2010), argues that most bylaws outside of the director election context will be held
invalid under CA, Inc. However, Sullivan does not analyze specific types of bylaws, and note
that bylaws are used widely outside of the context of setting rules for elections, e.g. in setting
the existence and duties of corporate officers.
170. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238-40 (Del. 2008).
171. Id. at 238.
172. Id.
173. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
174. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238.
175. Bruner, supra note 127, at 35-36.
176. Id.
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What other law might such a bylaw violate? The court looked to the
fiduciary duty that the common law imposed upon boards." It asked
whether there might be some circumstances under which the reimbursement
bylaw would force directors to violate their duties to the corporation.1 8 It
found that there are such circumstances." 9 For instance, if shareholders
engaged in a proxy contest were "motivated by personal or petty concerns,
or to promote interests that do not further, or are adverse to, those of the
corporation, the board's fiduciary duty could compel that reimbursement be
denied altogether."so
The court reached this conclusion by analogizing to cases where board-
approved merger contracts or rights plans might force violations of
fiduciary duties.'"' An obvious response is that matters are different where
shareholders impose limitations on the board rather than the board limiting
itself. Because, after all, the point of fiduciary duty is to protect
shareholders. One might very well think that if the shareholders themselves
have decided to limit board discretion, then it is no violation of fiduciary
duty for the board to abide by such shareholder-imposed limits.
The court calls this a "distinction . . . without a difference" 82 and a
response that "is more semantical than substantive."' These
characterizations are rather stupefying, frankly, and do not live up to the
normally high standards of reasoning in Delaware decisions. The core point
of fiduciary duty is to provide some court scrutiny of board actions that may
harm shareholders. Boards have widespread power to act on behalf of
shareholders, and neither shareholder-imposed limits nor statutory limits
can fully anticipate all the ways in which boards might abuse their power.
Thus, the standards-based approach of fiduciary rules provides a more
nuanced, contextual approach to limiting board misbehavior.'84 However, if
shareholders have considered a general class of actions and decided to limit
board behavior in a specified way, then that would seem to decide the
matter for that behavior-the board cannot do it if shareholders have said
they cannot (assuming shareholders have the power to set the rule in
question, as the court decided they did in this case). The point is not that
shareholders will always set the rules optimally in their own best interests-
they will get things wrong sometimes. But, if the shareholders have set a
177. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238-39.
178. Id. at 238.
179. Id. at 238-39.
180. Id. at 240.
181. Id.
182. Id at 239.
183. Id.
184. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 90-93.
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rule that it is within their power to set, then the board's fiduciary duty
comes to an end on that matter. The potential for misbehavior where boards
limit future board behavior is utterly different from situations where
shareholders limit future board behavior. Perhaps the court can defend its
result, but not by saying that there is no difference between the two
situations. How the court could label this distinction as merely "semantical"
is quite beyond me. Had students written that analysis on one of my exams,
they would not have fared well.'
At first blush, the consequences of this part of the CA, Inc. decision are
quite far-reaching. After all, with practically any bylaw it is possible to
imagine some circumstances under which the board might be forced to do
something which its fiduciary duty would otherwise forbid it from doing.
Thus, it would seem that virtually any bylaw would violate the law if
subjected to the case's style of facial analysis. However, two important
caveats limit the sweep of that analysis.
First, this analysis occurs in the context of a bylaw whose validity as a
subject for shareholder action comes from the general grant of authority
under section 109(b) rather than from a more specific statutory grant of
authority. Conceivably, the court's analysis might differ for bylaws based
on a more specific grant of authority.'8 6 Nowhere does the court explicitly
raise this possibility, and it may well be that the court would analyze bylaws
based on a specific grant of authority in the same way. It does seem that in
its analysis of whether the bylaw would force a violation of fiduciary duty,
the court was, in an odd way, re-visiting its discussion of the split of
authority between shareholders and boards that it had analyzed in the
previous section, and deciding that point in a way that was not really
consistent with its earlier analysis. Perhaps for a point of law in which
statutes have specifically granted authority to shareholders to set the rules,
the court would not interpret the common law fiduciary duty in such a broad
way. In a sense, this is an application of the rule that specific legal
provisions govern more general ones where the two conflict.
185. This analysis assumes that fiduciary duties are indeed for the benefit of shareholders,
the prevailing assumption in most scholarly analysis of Delaware corporate law. Christopher
Bruner points out that if one sees Delaware law as more ambiguous than that, the decision may
make more sense as a way for the courts to retain more discretion in drawing the line between
board and shareholder power. Christopher M. Bruner, Shareholder Bylaws and the Delaware
Corporation, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 67, 73 (2009).
186. If that is so, then the bylaw in question in CA, Inc. itself would now be valid, given
modifications to Delaware law. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
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Second, shareholders can protect a bylaw from the court's analysis by
including a "fiduciary duty out" clause. 187 These are common in merger no-
shop provisions. In those provisions, a merger contract may provide that the
seller cannot shop itself to other buyers. This limitation may violate
fiduciary duty under Delaware law. A fiduciary duty out provides that
where the limitation does violate fiduciary duty, the no-shop provision does
not apply. Such fiduciary duty outs may save no-shop provisions that would
otherwise be invalid.18 ' Although the court in CA, Inc. does not explicitly
consider the possibility of such a fiduciary duty out, because it analogizes
the reimbursement bylaw to no-shop provisions, presumably the fiduciary
duty outs that can save the latter should also be able to save the former.
How much of a limitation on the effectiveness of shareholder bylaws
would such fiduciary duty outs be? Would boards regularly exercise them to
ignore what a shareholder-enacted bylaw requires them to do? I doubt it, for
two reasons. First, exercising such a fiduciary duty out would be a blatant
slap in the face of shareholders. After all, a majority of shareholders will
have approved the bylaw in question. To exercise the out, the board will
have to argue that despite the shareholders' action, in the case in question
shareholders are acting so improperly that the board's fiduciary duty
compels it to ignore the stated preference of a majority of shareholders. I
doubt directors will want to do that very often, although only time will tell.
Second, where a board does exercise a fiduciary duty out, I would expect
the affected shareholders to challenge that action in court. For bylaws
regulating shareholder elections (the sort we are primarily concerned with in
this article), it will often be possible for the shareholders to plausibly
characterize the board's action as intended to limit the exercise of the
shareholder voting franchise. If the court accepts that characterization, the
stringent Blasius standard of review will apply,' and the board will almost
certainly be unable to justify its action. Even where the court does not apply
Blasius, I would expect a somewhat skeptical review of board claims that
"my fiduciary duty made me do it." Skepticism would certainly be justified.
Thus, although on its face CA, Inc. might appear to be a loss for
shareholders, in fact it is largely a win. The Delaware Supreme Court has
now held that shareholders have broad power to enact procedural bylaws.
187. Christopher Fawal, Protecting Shareholder Access to Director Elections: A Response
to CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Urging the Adoption of a Blasius Standard of Review for the Exercise
ofa Fiduciary-Out Clause, 59 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1478-83 (2010).
188. See William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an
Anomalous Concept, 55 Bus. LAW. 653, 653-54 (2000).
189. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660-62 (Del. Ch. 1988); see Fawal,
supra note 187.
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That power should be enough to enact most of what shareholders should
legitimately wish to enact. The requirement of including a fiduciary duty
out is annoying, but hopefully not much worse than that.
D. Post-CA Developments
Two changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law in the wake of
CA, Inc. further reinforce the power of shareholders to enact bylaws
regulating board elections. New section 113 explicitly legitimizes
reimbursement bylaws of the sort at stake in CA, Inc. Section 113 provides
that "[t]he bylaws may provide for the reimbursement by the corporation of
expenses incurred by a stockholder in soliciting proxies in connection with
an election of directors, subject to such procedures or conditions as the
bylaws may prescribe."'9"
Section 112 explicitly legitimizes proxy access bylaws stating that "[t]he
bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies with respect to
an election of directors, it may be required, to the extent and subject to such
procedures or conditions as may be provided in the bylaws, to include in its
proxy solicitation materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in
addition to individuals nominated by the board of directors, I or more
individuals nominated by a stockholder."' 91 Such bylaws were very likely
valid under the logic of CA, Inc., but now their validity is even more clear.
Note that the default rule, absent such a bylaw or board action, remains a
no-proxy-access rule. It appears that Delaware has now done what it is
willing to do in this area with these amendments. It acted by clarifying that
its altering rule gives shareholders the power to set bylaws in this area. It
did not show any interest in changing the default rule of no proxy access. It
appears unlikely to do so anytime soon.192
Do these new statutory provisions have any effect beyond
acknowledging and entrenching what was already definitely or likely true
given the result in CA, Inc.? That depends on how one resolves the
ambiguity in the case discussed above. Remember my suggestion that the
fiduciary duty analysis in the final section of the case conceivably might not
apply for a bylaw based on a more specific statutory grant of power than
190. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
191. Id. § 112.
192. The Committee on Corporate Law of the American Bar Association has adopted
similar rules for the Model Business Corporation Act. See Corporate Laws Committee Adopts
New Model Business Corporation Act Amendments to Provide for Proxy Access and Expense
Reimbursement, A.B.A. (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/
news release.cfm?releaseid=848.
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section 109(b). If so, then bylaws covered by sections 112 and 113 do not
require fiduciary duty outs. I would not suggest that shareholders trust in
that possibility, however, unless they want to test the logic.
Thus, shareholders have a fairly broad power to enact procedural bylaws
under Delaware state law (and I suspect the laws of other states as well).
The exact contours of "procedural" bylaws remain murky, but bylaws
regulating elements of corporate electoral contests appear quite likely to be
held valid, although they will probably need to include fiduciary duty outs.
E. Boards Amending Shareholder Bylaws
One other related state law question remains quite unclear in Delaware.
Once shareholders succeed in enacting a bylaw, to what extent if any may
the board amend or eliminate that bylaw through its own subsequent bylaw
amendment?193 In states which follow the Model Business Corporation Act,
the answer to this question is clear: the board cannot amend or repeal a
shareholder-enacted bylaw if that bylaw expressly so provides. 194
However, in Delaware the statutes are completely silent on this point,
with one exception. Under that exception, "[a] bylaw amendment adopted
by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the
election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board
of directors."' It might seem by negative implication that the board may
amend or repeal other shareholder bylaws. But the legislative history of this
provision, adopted recently in 2006, specifically rules out this negative
implication. 19
Thus, for all other sorts of shareholder amendments, we do not know
whether boards may amend or repeal shareholder bylaws. To my
knowledge, two Delaware cases addressed this point in dicta. One says the
board can amend shareholder bylaws,'9 7 and the other says the board
cannot.'9' The leading scholarly treatment argues the board can.199 But note:
193. This assumes that the certificate grants the board the power to amend the bylaws, a
nearly if not completely universal provision, and that nothing in the certificate limits the ability
of the board to amend shareholder-enacted bylaws.
194. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b)(2) (2007).
195. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (West, Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010).
196. "This amendment does not address any other situation in which the board of directors
amends a bylaw adopted by a stockholder vote." 2006 Del. Legis. Serv. ch. 306 synopsis
(West).
197. Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990).
198. Am. Int'l Rent A Car, Inc. v. Cross, No. 7583, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413, at *8-9
(Del. Ch. May 9, 1984).
199. Hamermesh, supra note 12, at 467-75.
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that treatment did not turn out to be correct in predicting the scope of valid
shareholder bylaws, advocating a more limited scope than the court adopted
in CA, Inc.
This question is at least potentially of great practical importance. Boards
can act much more quickly and easily than shareholders in public
corporations, since there are several orders of magnitude more shareholders
than directors. If boards can legally amend or repeal shareholder bylaws,
then as soon as shareholders succeed in passing a bylaw the directors do not
like, boards would have the power to immediately eliminate or amend those
bylaws. However, this threat may not be as bad as it looks. First,
shareholders could enact procedural limits (in the bylaws) to make it harder
for boards to repeal shareholder bylaws. Second, I would guess that boards
would be reluctant to act so blatantly against shareholder-enacted rules. As
with the exercise of fiduciary duty outs, it strikes me as a rather desperate
act that boards would resort to only in extremis.
In sum, these recent developments represent rather typical behavior for
Delaware. Maintaining Delaware's place as the leading haven for
incorporation creates some bias against expanding shareholder power at the
cost of board power. Yet the value of experimentation and tailoring, and
freedom of contract more generally, make a significant shareholder bylaw
power one area where Delaware is willing to expand shareholder power
somewhat. Moreover, this expansion takes place in a context of increased
federal attention to this area, so that Delaware probably feels a need to be
seen as acting in order to fend off more drastic federal action. And yet,
Delaware is not willing to go so far as to create a pro-proxy access default
rule.
V. DEVELOPMENTS AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
And so, Delaware state law is now fairly hospitable for shareholder
initiatives supporting proxy access and other issues. The default rule
remains no proxy access. However, shareholders have the power to enact
bylaws providing for proxy access, although they may need to provide for a
fiduciary duty out and a threat of board repeal or amendment remains. The
situation is broadly similar in other states. I am aware of no states other than
North Dakota which provide for some proxy access as a default rule.2 00 The
general scope of the bylaw power in other states is less clear-the statutory
language is similar,2 0 1 but other states do not have a case like CA, Inc.
200. See supra note 132.
201. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.06 (2007).
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clarifying this language. In many other states it is clear that boards may not
amend shareholder bylaws that provide they may not be amended.202
A. The Rule 14a-8 Framework
Overall, this is not enough for proxy access bylaws to become a
widespread phenomenon. The same collective action problems that make
proxy access crucial for shareholder nominations recur at the level of
proposing proxy access bylaws. Shareholders can engage in their own proxy
solicitation to pass a proxy access bylaw, but this is prohibitively
expensive. 203 The obvious alternative is for shareholders to have their proxy
access bylaws included within the corporate proxy material under the Rule
14a-8 process.
However, boards will try to exclude those bylaw proposals. Four
possible bases of exclusion are of the most general importance for proxy
access bylaws.204 We have already encountered the first two. One
possibility until recently was to argue that the proposal is not a valid subject
for shareholder action. 205 After CA, Inc. and the addition of section 112, this
argument is a loser for proxy access bylaws in Delaware corporations,
although for companies incorporated elsewhere this argument remains
available. A second possible basis for exclusion is that the proposal
otherwise violates state law206 by forcing boards to violate their fiduciary
duty. As we have seen, this argument prevailed in CA, Inc., but can be
blocked if the proposed bylaw contains a fiduciary duty out. Whether other
states will accept the strained reasoning in this part of CA, Inc. remains to
be seen.
A third possible basis for exclusion is that proxy access bylaws fall
within the ordinary business operation exception. 207 There has been little
guidance on the excludability of proxy access proposals on this ground
because they have been excluded instead on the ground to be discussed
202. See id. § 10.20.
203. See supra note 22.
204. Depending on particular circumstances, boards may try to exclude a proposal on bases
other than the four mentioned in the text. If the language favoring the proposal contains attacks
on the current board which can be painted as untrue, the board may argue that inclusion would
violate federal securities law, in particular Rule 14a-9, which prohibits making false statements
in a proxy solicitation. If previous proposals have been defeated by a large enough margin, the
board may exclude a proposal under the prevention allowing exclusion of proposals that have
been defeated by adequately large margins. If the proposal can be described as duplicating a
board's own proposal, it may be excluded on that ground.
205. 17 C.F.R. § 14a-8(i)(1) (2008).
206. Id. § 14a-8(i)(2).
207. Id. § 141-8(i)(7).
104 [ Ariz. St. L.J.
OPTIMAL RULES FOR PROXY A CCESS
next.208 In general, the SEC has held proxy access proposals that are aimed
at corporate governance matters non-excludable on this ground.209 Proxy
access would seem to fall squarely within that analysis, and hence should
not be excluded on this basis.
The main obstacle to proxy access bylaws, until recently, was the
exclusion of proposals that relate to an election. 210 There has been a lot of
relevant action on this point in recent years. This recent action relates to an
election exclusion that the SEC added to Rule 14a-8 in 1976.211 Early no-
action letters interpreted the exclusion rather narrowly, forbidding exclusion
of proposals that would regulate the election process. 2 12 At some point in
the eighties, the SEC staff began to allow exclusion of proposals regulating
the election process if they were likely to lead to contested elections.2 13
Under this interpretation, proxy access bylaws were excludable.
Shareholder activists became more and more interested in proxy access,
and in 2003, the SEC floated a major change in its policy. Under the 2003
Proposal, corporations would have been required to follow a version of
proxy access if one of two triggers were activated.2 14 Once triggered,
shareholders who collectively held at least five percent of the outstanding
shares for at least two years could have nominated directors using the
corporate proxy, but only for a minority of the open positions. 2 15 This
Proposal received a huge number of comments,2 16 but the SEC never acted
on it.
Frustrated with the SEC, shareholders tried to get their way in court. In
2006, they succeeded with the Second Circuit. In American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees, Employees Pension Fund v.
American International Group, Inc., the court held that the SEC's
interpretation of its own rule was arbitrary.217 In particular, the court
objected to the agency's changed interpretation over the years with no
208. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 5, at 259.
209. Id.
210. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2011).
211. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Emps. Pension Plan v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc.,
462 F.3d 121, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2006).
212. Id. at 128.
213. Id.
214. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786-805 (Oct. 14, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 & 274).
215. Id.
216. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903.shtml (last modified July 9, 2009) [hereinafter
Comment Letters].
217. Am. Int'l Grp., 462 F.3d at 123.
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reason given. The court read the exclusion more narrowly to only prohibit
shareholders from using Rule 14a-8 itself as a direct basis for nominating
directors through a Rule 14a-8 proposal.218
This was a rather aggressive attack on the SEC's ability to interpret its
own rule, and the SEC struck back. There was disagreement within the SEC
as to how to respond. In 2007, the SEC set forth for comment two
competing rule changes responding to the Second Circuit.2 19 One of these
amended Rule 14a-8 to reinstate the SEC's former interpretation allowing
exclusion of proposals such as proxy access. 2 20 The competing proposal
would have allowed shareholders to propose proxy access bylaws under
certain conditions, including a five percent share ownership requirement.2 2 1
Ultimately, the SEC opted for the former approach, and again allowed
boards to exclude proxy access proposals.2 22
B. The SEC's Proposal-Default Rule
However, that law has now changed. In June of 2009, the SEC floated a
new proxy access proposal. This proposal had two main parts. The first
provided a proxy access regime that applies to all companies governed by
the SEC's proxy rules. The second main part allowed shareholders to
modify that regime to provide more generous proxy access rules.223
The 2009 Proposal featured a new Rule 14a-11224 This rule creates a
proxy access regime. Shareholders who fulfill the requirements of that
regime would be able to use the corporate proxy material to nominate
directors. As proposed, leading features of that regime included the
following:
The nominating shareholders would collectively have to own
more than a specified minimum percentage of the voting
218. Id. at 129-30.
219. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release
No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 91 SEC Docket 575, 580-82 (July
27, 2007); Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,469-80 (July 27, 2007) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240).
220. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release
No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 91 SEC Docket 575, 580-82 (July
27, 2007).
221. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,469-80.
222. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release
No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 91 SEC Docket at 580-82.
223. See 2009 Proposal, supra note 117, at 29,024.
224. Id. at 29,032, 29,082.
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shares. The proposed minimum thresholds were one, three, or
five percent, depending on the size of the corporation.225
* Shareholders would have had to hold those shares for at least
one year.226
* The number of directors that can be nominated under this
procedure is limited to no more than one nominee or twenty-
five percent of the board, whichever is greater.227
* There is an elaborate procedure for resolving disputes over the
application of the rules.228
* There are disclosure requirements for nominating shareholders
229and nominees.
C. The SEC's Proposal-Altering Rule
The 2009 Proposal also proposed re-writing the "relates to an election"
basis for exclusion. It significantly narrows this basis, allowing for
exclusion only if a proposal:
* "Would disqualify a nominee who is standing for election;" 2 30
* "Would remove a director from office before his or her term
expired;" 231
* "Questions the competence, business judgment, or character of
one or more nominees or directors;" 23 2
* "Nominates a specific individual for election to the board of
directors, other than pursuant to Rule 14a- 11, an applicable
state law provision, or a company's governing documents;" 233
or
* "Otherwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election
of directors."234
225. Id. at 29,035, 29,083 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-1 1(b)(1)).
226. Id. at 29,037, 29,083 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-11(b)(2)).
227. Id. at 29,043, 29,084 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-1 1(d)).
228. Id. at 29,075-76, 29,084 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-1 1(f)).
229. Id. at 29,074-76, 29,085 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-18).
230. Id. at 29,082 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(i)).
231. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(ii)).
232. Id (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(iii)).
233. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(iv)).
234. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(v)).
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That final language is ominously open-ended and could potentially be
used to block proxy access bylaws. However, the Proposing Release makes
clear that a much narrower interpretation is intended, covering only
proposals "that are comparable to the four specified categories and would
undermine the purpose of the exclusion."2 3s
This amendment to Rule 14a-8 would allow shareholder bylaw proposals
that provide for proxy access on more generous grounds than the proposed
Rule 14a- 11. But these bylaws would restrict proxy access to narrower
terms than the proposed Rule 14a-1 1.236
D. The SEC Proposal-Reaction
Thus, this proposal changed both the default rule and the altering rule for
proxy access. The prior default rule was no proxy access.2 37 The new
default rule would be proxy access for shareholders who met the ownership
and other restrictions of proposed Rule 14a-1 1.238 The prior altering rule
was that boards could provide for proxy access, and that shareholders (at
least in Delaware, and probably other states as well) could provide for
proxy access in a bylaw, but they had to cover the high costs of a proxy
solicitation if they want to enact such a bylaw. 9 The new altering rule
would lower the costs to shareholders for enacting proxy access bylaws
with more generous access than proposed Rule 14a- 11, but would
completely block boards or shareholders from setting proxy access rules
that are more restrictive than 14a- 11.240
The SEC received a large number of comments on this proposal. The
comments were relatively predictable. Corporate managers and the law
firms that represent them are not happy.2 4' They would prefer no change to
the status quo, and to the extent that some change does happen, they would
prefer two alternatives.2 42 The better (from their point of view) of these
alternatives would be to amend Rule 14a-8 as suggested but leave out the
235. Id. at 29,058.
236. Id.
237. Except for North Dakota corporations. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-35-08 (West,
Westlaw through 2009 Regular Session) (granting right to proxy access to shareholders holding
over five percent of outstanding shares).
238. 2009 Proposal, supra note 117, at 29,082-85.
239. See discussion supra Part IV.C-D.
240. 2009 Proposal, supra note 117, at 29,024, 29,031.
241. See, e.g., Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell et al., to SEC 1-7 (Aug. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/decisions/081909letter.pdf.
242. Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al., to SEC 14 (Aug. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/decisions/081909letter.pdf.
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new Rule 14a- 11. Under this alternative, the default rule would remain no
proxy access for nominations, but shareholders could use Rule 14a-8 to
propose bylaws that allow for proxy access. The other alternative that
manager-friendly groups suggested was to follow the SEC's proposal, but
allow shareholder bylaws that alter the new Rule 14a- 11 in any direction,
including bylaws that restrict access more than Rule 14a- 11.243
Shareholders and groups that represent them were mostly favorable to
the SEC's proposal. 24 Law professors who commented on the proposed
rules mostly favored the proposal as well.245 A major exception is Joseph
Grundfest, who argued that the proposal is "arbitrary and capricious" and
should be struck down by courts if enacted. 246 His core argument is that the
central rationale for proxy access is that shareholders should be trusted to
nominate and choose directors, and yet the proposal does not trust
shareholders to enact proxy access rules that are stricter than those of Rule
14a- 1 1.24 Grundfest argues that the SEC gives no reason for trusting
shareholders on the former point given that it does not trust them on the
latter point.
Part of the reason for the SEC's delay of a little over a year in enacting
its proposal was some doubt as to whether it had the statutory authority to
do so. That changed in the summer of 2010 with the enactment of financial
regulation reform. A section of the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly gave the SEC
243. Id. at 1.
244. See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth Colombo, Fund Coordinator, Sheet Metal Workers
Nat'l Pension Fund to SEC 1 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
10-09/s71009-283.pdf; Letter from Warren L. Mart, Gen. Sec'y and Treasurer, Int'l Ass'n. of
Machinists, to SEC 1 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009-319.pdf; Letter from the Bd. of Dirs. of Shareowner Educ. Network, to SEC 3 (Aug.
17, 2009) (on file with the SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
496.pdf.
245. See Letter from Lucian Bebchuk on Behalf of a Bi-Partisan Group of 80 Professors, to
SEC 1 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-282.pdf.
246. See Letter from Joseph Grundfest, Co-Director, Professor of Law and Bus., Stanford
Law Sch., to SEC 1 (July 24, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009-64.pdf. The Business Roundtable has used this argument in the case which has
caused the SEC to stay the new rules. See Order Granting Stay, Securities Act Release No.
9,149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010
SEC LEXIS 3275 passim (Oct. 4, 2010). For an argument that the new law is not arbitrary and
capricious, see generally Reed T. Schuster, Rule 14a-11 and the Administrative Procedure Act:
It's Better to Have Had and Waived, Than Never to Have Had at All, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1034
(2011).
247. Letter from Joseph Grundfest, Co-Director, Professor of Law and Bus., Stanford Law
Sch., to SEC 4 (January 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009-599.pdf.
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authority to enact rules regulating proxy access.248 Very soon afterward, the
SEC enacted its new rules.
E. The SEC's New Rules
The SEC's final rules were close to the proposed rules, but there were
some significant changes to the default rule under Rule 14a- 11. The main
changes were as follows:
* The proposing shareholder group must own three percent of
the outstanding shares, a level that applies for all corporations
rather than the sliding one/three/five percent scale of the
proposal.249
* The shareholders must have held shares at or above the three
percent level for at least three years, rather than the one year
holding period of the proposal.250
* Should two or more groups make nominations for the same
election, the group with the most shares wins out, rather than
the first to file as in the proposal.25 1
The altering rule in the final rule was as proposed. That is, Rule 14a-8
was amended as described above.252 Shareholders can now make bylaw
proposals that make proxy access available on more generous terms than
Rule 14a- 11. However, they cannot make proxy access available on more
stingy terms. The SEC has stayed its new rule pending judicial resolution of
a case brought by the Business Roundtable.
In sum, the SEC's actions in this area recently, like those of Delaware,
are broadly typical of what we should expect from that relationship. In
devising a new default rule for proxy access, the SEC stepped in to correct
the overly pro-manager bias we sometimes see in Delaware. But the SEC
has gone too far and enacted an overly rigid rule. The SEC is prone to lose
sight of the advantages of experimentation and variation that
decisionmakers in Delaware are so well aware of.
248. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 971, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
249. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(1) (2011).
250. Shareholder Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,782, 56,782 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 1(b)(1)).
251. Id. at 56,786 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(e)).
252. Shareholder Proposals, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,782, 56,782-86 (Sept. 16, 2010) (amending 17
C.F.R. § 24 0.14a-8); Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 56,668.
253. See Order Granting Stay, Securities Act Release No. 9,149, Exchange Act Release No.
63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010 SEC LEXIS 3275 passim (Oct. 4,
2010).
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VI. THE OPTIMAL RULES
How do these state and federal developments fare when considered in
light of the policy considerations discussed in Part III? Let us consider first
the optimal default rule, then the optimal altering rule, and finally the
optimal mix of federal and state rulemaking in this area.
A. Optimal Default Rule
It is increasingly hard to defend no proxy access as a default rule. The
leading approach to setting default rules is to determine the majoritarian
rule, which is the rule that shareholders in a majority of corporations would
set if they could costlessly consider and bargain over the rule in question.25 4
Of course, determining what the majoritarian rule is for a disputed topic is
not so easy.
No proxy access, of course, has been the dominant practice for the
history of American corporations. This historical dominance gives it some
claim to being the majoritarian default-if it were a blatantly bad rule, then
presumably more corporations would have opted out. However, the altering
rule that has been in place reduces the weight of that argument. The no-
proxy-access default rule favors the board, and the altering rule makes it
quite hard for shareholders to opt out of that rule without board approval. If
this pro-board rule were truly awful, then the gains from altering it would
have induced some boards to offer a different rule. But given the private
gains directors and officers get from this pro-board rule it seems likely that
companies will not opt out of it as long as it is only moderately bad.255
Today there is clearly a strong interest in proxy access. Many
institutional investors would like to see it.256 As argued in Part III,
shareholder election of boards is a universal feature of American
corporations, and one that the principle of accountability clearly justifies.
Delaware case law also stresses the importance of the shareholder franchise
as legitimating the power vested in boards.25 7 And yet, shareholder elections
in American public corporations are mostly a sham because of board control
over the nominating procedures and the high costs of proxy solicitations.25
To this must be added the effective antitakeover defenses now in place at
most American corporations, which rule out the one situation in which
254. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 93.
255. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 93, at 492; see also supra text accompanying note
93.
256. See, e.g., Comment Letters, supra note 216.
257. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
258. See Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 688-94.
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shareholder elections can play a real role.259 In light of all this, it is hard to
believe that no proxy access is what shareholders in a majority of public
corporations would choose if they could act costlessly.260
We considered in Part III whether systematic shareholder mistakes or the
bias of shareholder activists may support a no-proxy-access default rule. To
succeed, these arguments must establish not only that most shareholders are
ill-informed on most topics or that shareholder activists may have interests
that differ from those of other shareholders. The arguments must further
show that a majority of shareholders will typically, or at least too often, be
unaware of their own limitations and those of shareholder activists. But why
should that be? Throughout history, shareholders have typically deferred to
boards because they knew well that directors were better informed than
they. Why should that not still be the case, except in circumstances where
there is pretty strong evidence of a board that is either incompetent or not
pursuing shareholders interests?
There are other ways to think about setting default rules besides the
majoritarian approach. Penalty default rules may be unattractive to one
party in order to induce that party to share private information by acting to
change the default.2 6 ' In the context of public corporations, officers and
directors are the party most likely to have private information. Thus, setting
a default rule against their interests seems suggested by this approach. No
proxy access is certainly not such a default.
A related approach to setting default rules for corporate law has been
suggested by Bebchuk and Hamdani.They suggest setting pro-shareholder
defaults because boards can act more easily to change default rules than can
shareholders.26 2 Thus, if the pro-shareholder default rule is optimal, it will
stay in place, while if a more pro-manager rule would be better, it will be
easy to opt in to the better rule. In contrast, if the default rule is pro-
manager but the better rule is pro-shareholder, many corporations might not
opt in to the better rule. Once again, this approach does not favor the no-
proxy-access default rule.263
Perhaps the best defense of the no-proxy-access default rule is that it is
simplest. Once one decides to set a rule favoring some degree of proxy
access, there are lots of choices to make as to who will get access. These
259. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 890 (2002).
260. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 75.
261. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 97.
262. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 93, at 491-92; see also Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note
75.
263. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 75, at 333-50 (Bebchuk and Hirst argue this at
length for proxy access).
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choices get complex and rather arbitrary. It may be best to stand back, set a
simple no access default rule, and then let shareholders step in, opt out, and
design the details of an access system themselves.26
Perhaps, but I tend to think not. After all, we generally do not want
shareholders designing detailed policies. A leading defense of corporate law
as setting optimal defaults is that it makes such detailed choices in plausible
ways, avoiding the necessity for individual companies to reinvent the wheel
each time.2 65 A no-access rule is easy to write; if the default rule allows for
proxy access, it is very easy to write down a rule that provides for access
instead of a rule for no access.
In contrast, a proxy access regime involves setting rules along a number
of different dimensions, as one can see from the outline above of Rule 14 a-
11.266 What threshold level of shares should nominating shareholders be
required to own? How long should they be required to have owned them?
How many directors should they be able to nominate? What should they be
required to disclose? And so on. These rules will be lengthy. Indeed, as
Bebchuk and Hirst point out, a shareholder proposal which tried to set out
such rules from scratch would be much longer than the allowed limit under
Rule 14a-8.267 We avoid transaction costs by not requiring each corporation
that wants to allow for proxy access to write these rules from scratch.
Where a corporation wants to allow for some proxy access, but is not
satisfied with the exact rules of a default proxy access regime, it can write a
short opt-out provision that simply addresses the dimensions on which it
chooses to vary from the default (e.g., a threshold shareholding level of five
percent rather than three percent).
But how do we decide which of the many possible default settings for
the various relevant dimensions are best? Grundfest argues that the SEC
should conduct a random survey of shareholder preferences before
finalizing its rule if it chooses (against his wishes) a proxy access default
rule.268 It is not a bad idea. But after all, agencies make educated guesses
about the best way to set debatable rules all the time without conducting
such surveys. The SEC surely received plenty of input on its proposal. Most
importantly, the opt-out mechanism, if modified as I suggest, would give
the SEC a good way to calibrate its rule over time. If it finds that
264. This is basically Grundfest's argument for an opt-in regime with no proxy access as
the default. See Grundfest, supra note 86, at 385-87, 392-93.
265. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 34-35.
266. See supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
267. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 75, at 341. One could of course increase the 500-word
limit. However, that seems unattractive if one is concerned about the transaction costs already
associated with shareholder proposals.
268. Grundfest, supra note 86, at 385.
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shareholders in a large fraction of corporations are opting out of the Rule
14a-11 default in a particular way, the agency can modify the rule
accordingly.
So the simplicity argument for a no-proxy-access default rule is not
persuasive, and most of the other arguments above for how to set default
rules argue against the no-proxy-access default rule. The default rule,
therefore, should set out a regime that allows relatively generous proxy
access. 269
B. Optimal Altering Rule
As for the optimal altering rule, the argument for giving shareholders
significant authority to alter the default rules for proxy access is quite
strong. Shareholder election of directors is a core legitimate and
legitimating shareholder power. This is an area where directors are tempted
to set sub-optimal rules that entrench themselves. It is not an area where
shareholders would be exercising power over complex questions of
operational decisions that are beyond their judgment. Accountability within
principle/agent rules thus strongly favors giving the shareholders the ability
to opt out of the prevailing default rule. Flexibility and freedom of contract
also support a strong shareholder role in the altering rule because boards
will not be likely to act to change a default rule that favors them even if the
change would be efficient.
The SEC's new rules have an asymmetric altering rule: they allow
shareholders to opt for more generous proxy access than the default rule,
but not more stingy access. Does this make sense? The proposal is clearly
correct in prohibiting boards from opting out of the Rule, without
shareholder approval, in a more stingy direction-given the self-interest of
boards that justifies the proxy access default in the first place. Such a board
opt-out procedure would be blatantly self-defeating. Other safeguards on a
shareholder opt-out also make sense.270
But why not let shareholders opt out in any way they choose? Professor
Grundfest has put the point rather too strongly, but his basic thrust is on
target.27 1 If we trust shareholders to nominate directors, why not also trust
269. Relatively generous because it is easier for boards to move to a less generous
alternative than for shareholder activists to move to a more generous alternative. See Bebchuk &
Hirst, supra note 75, at 338-39.
270. Id. at 356-58 (outlining important safeguards).
271. Grundfest is wrong, though, as to what the default rule should be. He argues for a no-
access default rather than the 14a- 11 default. Grundfest, supra note 86, at 362. He says the
SEC's proposal assumes without evidence that a majority of shareholders prefer the 14a-11
[ Ariz. S t. L. J.1 14
OPTIMAL RULES FOR PROXYACCESS
them to choose different rules than the SEC has chosen? The SEC's one-
way ratchet seems to protect shareholders against themselves, but is that
really necessary? Why? Perhaps the principle of accountability suggests the
one-way ratchet as a way to avoid board manipulation of a more flexible
rule. But, there are clear benefits to allowing opting out in any direction.
Although proposed Rule 14a- 11 makes what I find to be quite reasonable
guesses as to the balance between allowing shareholders access and not
making access so easy as to encourage nuisance actions, it is possible it has
not gotten the balance right, either in general or for some corporations. A
more flexible altering rule allows for more experimentation and tailoring,
and also gives more authority to shareholders. If the SEC's default rule does
have serious problems, we should be able to observe and correct them as
shareholders in many corporations opt out of the objectionable elements.
Absent some strong argument,272 it is very hard to see why we should limit
shareholder authority to set whatever proxy access rules a majority of them
choose.
The SEC's response to its critics on this point is that proxy access is a
right for each individual shareholder. We are not generally in the habit of
allowing a majority of shareholders to waive rights guaranteed under the
securities law for all shareholders, and we should not do so with this right
either.273 But if this is such a hallowed individual right, why has the SEC
limited it in effect to such a small group of shareholders with the three
percent/three year requirements, which very few will be able to meet, even
acting in groups? The defense for those restrictions is they balance the gains
from allowing shareholders to participate in voting with the possible costs
and disruptions that proxy access may cause.274 But that sort of balancing is
not how we treat rights, it is how we make hard judgment calls in crafting
proper corporate governance regimes. I think the SEC has made plausible
judgment calls in crafting Rule 14a- 11. However, it and I may be wrong,
rules to no access. Id. at 367, 385. However, Grundfest himself makes the opposite assumption,
and initially presented no evidence for it. See id. at 365. Grundfest now points to some empirical
evidence that share prices have reacted negatively to the SEC's proposal. Joseph A. Grundfest,
Measurement Issues in the Proxy Access Debate 2-3 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance,
Working Paper No. 71, Stanford Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 392,
2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-1538630. Such evidence, though, is quite
sensitive as to how to choose dates for the event study, and what else was happening on those
dates. Moreover, even if the studies do persuasively suggest the market has reacted negatively
to the SEC's proposal, that could be due to concerns over its overly-rigid altering rule rather
than its default rule.
272. Bebchuk and Hirst take a stab at such arguments, but do not convince themselves.
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 75, at 351-53.
273. Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 56,673.
274. Id. at 56,690.
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either in general or for some specific companies. The shareholders should
be allowed to make differing judgment for themselves.
Thus, to some extent our two core principles of accountability and
freedom of contract are at odds on the issue of whether shareholders should
be allowed to opt for more restrictive proxy access than allowed by the
default Rulel4a- 1l. Accountability gives some justification for the SEC's
approach. However, it is a weak justification that appears to be protecting
shareholders against themselves in a way that is in serious tension with
expanded shareholder power. Freedom of contract, by contrast, strongly
favors allowing shareholders to opt out in any direction they choose.
So, the optimal default rule would provide for relatively generous proxy
access, and the optimal altering rule would allow shareholders to opt out of
the default rule in any direction they choose.
C. Federalism
How do the developments in Delaware and the SEC's new rules match
up against these optimal rules?
Delaware now looks pretty good, but far from perfect. The straying from
perfection may well represent the modest managerialist tilt of Delaware
law. But the fact that Delaware has not strayed too far in a managerialist
direction probably reflects both the role that shareholders and markets play
in creating incentives for Delaware lawmakers and also the restraining
influence due to the threat of federal preemption.2 75
The default rule in Delaware remains no proxy access. This is in part a
result of the fact that proxy regulation has for decades now been largely a
matter of federal regulation. Delaware law has thus been able to afford to be
under-developed in this area. Nonetheless it is possible for states to set
explicit rules for proxy access-one state, North Dakota, has done so. 2 76
Delaware could and should follow suit.
Although Delaware's default rule is faulty, its altering rule is better.
Delaware gave shareholders more power to opt out in CA, Inc. and the new
section 112.277 Even though the default rule may not be great, at least
shareholders now have the power to design their own systems of proxy
access without requiring board approval.
Three features, though, limit the effectiveness of this altering rule at
present. First, the probable need to include a fiduciary duty out provision in
275. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part IV.
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proxy access bylaws is at least a nuisance. One hopes that other states will
not follow this silly development in Delaware. Second, the possibility that
boards may be able to amend or repeal shareholders proxy access bylaws is
at least annoying, and may work out to be worse than annoying in practice,
although one hopes not. Luckily boards cannot do this in many other states,
including those that follow the Model Business Corporation Act.
The third feature limiting the effectiveness of the current altering rule
comes through the practical difficulty of shareholder action to enact bylaw
amendments. Conceivably, state law could act to help overcome this
collective action problem. However, federal securities law helped place
obstacles to shareholder action through voting in the first place.278
Moreover, Rule 14a-8 has now been entrenched for decades as the main
tool for overcoming this kind of collective action problem. Thus, it makes
sense to look to federal securities law for handling this problem, and Rule
14a-8 is the traditional way to encourage shareholder collective action. It
therefore made a great deal of sense to change the old interpretation of Rule
14a-8. This is what blocked shareholders from effectively using their bylaw
power under state law to set their own proxy access rules.
Additionally, the new SEC rules go beyond this change in the altering
rule to also change the default rule. They also harden the altering rule by not
allowing shareholders to opt out of the proposed new default in a way that
restricts access. Are the new rules justified in these elements?
In setting a new default rule, the SEC indeed is justified. We have seen
above that there are many arguments against, and few arguments for, the
no-access default rule that prevails in almost every state. A new default rule
that allows for some proxy access is clearly justified. One might prefer to
see the states setting up proxy access default regimes. One can imagine
states setting up a variety of access regimes. As long as Delaware's rule was
not too limited, we could well stand to learn a lot from experimentation at
the state level. However, states (aside from North Dakota) are not doing
this. This seems to be an instance of the overly managerialist tilt of state
corporate law. When that tilt manifests itself, it is time for the federal
government to step in and set the balance right.2 79 That time has come with
proxy access.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that for decades we have
looked mostly to federal rather than state law in setting the rules for proxy
solicitations, and that the federal proxy rules themselves helped to create the
high costs of independent solicitation which make Rule 14a-8 a necessity in
278. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 822-24 (1992).
279. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
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the first place.28 0 Given state recalcitrance and traditional federal
involvement in this area, it is appropriate for the SEC to set a better default
rule where all but one state has failed to act. Thus, those managers,
corporate lawyers, and others who call for only a revision to Rule 14a-8
without the new Rule 14a-1 1 are wrong.2 81
As we have seen above, the optimal altering rule would allow
shareholders to opt out in any direction, unlike the asymmetric altering rule
of the SEC's rules. Also, a balanced approach to federalism suggests that
the SEC should be wary of encroaching too far on the ability of states and
corporations to experiment with different rules. It is probably right for the
SEC to step in and set a new default here, but the altering rule should soften
that move by allowing flexibility where shareholders so choose.
Thus, the SEC in many ways has improved matters with the new default
rule, Rule 14a- 11. It was also a good idea to limit the old relates to an
election exclusion. However, the SEC should allow shareholders (not
boards) to opt out of Rule 14a- 11 in any direction they choose (though, of
course, boards should be allowed to opt out in a direction that is more
generous to shareholders than Rule 14a- 11).
D. Summary
We can summarize the alternatives as follows. One can envision the core
possible rules on the following grid, reflecting choices both as to default
rules and altering rules. The default rule may be set in a way that allows for
no proxy access or some degree of access. The altering rule can be set in a
way that makes it hard for shareholders to alter the default rule or easy to
alter the default rule.
280. See Black, supra note 278, at 824.
281. That is not to say that I agree with all details of new Rule 14a-11 as a default rule. The
appropriate ownership threshold is debatable, though it strikes me as a quite reasonable guess.
Having a holding period for nominating shareholders to avoid short-termism makes sense, but
three years may be too long. More importantly, I am not at all convinced that shareholders
should be limited in the number of nominees they can include, as Rule 14a-1 1 does. For
empirical evidence that this limitation will help make proxy access little used, see generally
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignficance of Proxy Access (N.Y. Univ. Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 10-51, 2010), available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract-1695682.
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Altering Rule
Hard to alter Easy to alter
Default No Old status quo New Rule 14a-8 but not
Rule access Rule 14a-l l
Access SEC rules with respect to SEC rules with respect to
access rules less generous rules more generous than
than Rule 14a-11 Rule 14a-11
My suggestion with respect
to moves in any direction
from Rule 14a- 11
The old status quo is in the upper left box, with a default rule of no
access and an altering rule that made opting out of that default rule hard
given the old interpretation of Rule 14a-8 (although the altering rule would
have made the default even harder to change had Delaware interpreted its
law to not allow shareholders to enact proxy access bylaws). In the box to
the right of this is the suggestion of many opponents of the SEC's proposal
that the SEC drop Rule 14a- 11, but retain the revision of Rule 14a-8. The
default rule would then be no access, but it would become much easier for
shareholders to alter that rule. The SEC's new rules are somewhat
ambiguously situated within these alternatives. The SEC's rules change the
default rule to support proxy access, and hence they fit in the bottom row.
They fit within the bottom left box with respect to access rules that are less
generous than Rule 14a- 11: for those rules, it is be extremely hard (harder
than before the new rules) to opt out of the default rule. The SEC's rules fit
within the bottom right box with respect to access rules that are more
generous than Rule 14a- 11: for those rules, shareholders can more easily
than before opt out of the default rule. My own suggestion is that we should
move entirely within that bottom right box: use Rule 14a-1 1, or something
close to it, as the default rule, but make it easy for shareholders to opt out of
that rule in any direction they choose.
The similarity of many of the arguments surrounding shareholder power
and board accountability as applied to both the default rule and the altering
rule suggests a strong pull of attraction to the positions along the upper left-
lower right diagonal. The upper left box represents a judgment that more
shareholder power is unattractive in both the default rule and the altering
rule. The lower right box represents a judgment that more shareholder
power is attractive in both rules. Are either of the off-diagonal positions
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defensible? Above we suggested arguments that may support them, 28 2 but
they are a bit of a stretch. Grundfest makes a strong case for the
inconsistency of the lower left position in the SEC's new rules, but fails to
note the problems with his own position in the upper right box.283 If he
believes shareholders can make sensible decisions in voting on proxy access
bylaw proposals, why does he not believe they can make sensible decisions
in choosing among competing board candidates? Perhaps one can mount a
good argument distinguishing the ability of shareholders to make these two
kinds of decisions. I am unaware of anyone having done so to date.
E. What Next? Possible Board Responses
Over the next few years we may start to see shareholders use the Rule
14a- 11 process to nominate directors and/or see bylaw proposals put in
place more generous processes. Given the rather high hurdle of the three
percent / three year eligibility rules, I would not expect to see many
shareholder nominations, but presumably there will be some. That is not the
end of the story, though. Many boards will be unhappy with this incursion
on their power, and will look for ways to prevent shareholder nominations
or blunt their impact.
J.W. Verret has suggested a number of ingenious strategies boards might
use. These include charter amendments preventing public and union
pension funds from voting, golden or tin parachutes triggered by election
contests, dividends contingent upon no shareholder-nominated directors,
share issuances to reduce voting levels, director resignation policies,
withholding indemnification or insurance from shareholder directors,
buying out the shares of nominating groups, director qualification bylaws,
election expense bonds, and poison pills with low thresholds triggered by
shareholder communications in advance of proxy contests.284 If Verret is
right, we may see an explosion of litigation concerning the validity of these
defenses similar to the hostile takeover litigation of the eighties and
nineties.
But I offer several cautions concerning Verret's practical and legal
analysis. On the practical side, we may not see a rapid proliferation of the
defenses he suggests, for at least two reasons. First, as just mentioned, the
Rule 14a- 11 requirements are strenuous enough that few shareholders may
282. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 271.
284. J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware's Future
Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 IOWA J. CORP. L. 391, 393-95
(2011).
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be able to meet them, so boards may feel little actual threat. Second, even if
boards do feel threatened, they may not be wise to use the defenses Verret
suggests, at least not the more extreme ones. Many of them strike me as
serious slaps in the face of shareholders, and attacking your shareholders is
not generally the best of ideas. Among other things, shareholders may fight
back. For some of Verret's proposals, one can readily imagine shareholders
countering with bylaws of their own--e.g., a bylaw requiring that no
director be indemnified or insured at a higher level than any other level. Or,
shareholders angered by one of Verret's suggestions could enact a proxy
access bylaw with more generous terms than Rule 14a- 11, in particular,
bylaws which allow shareholders to nominate a majority of board positions,
and then proceed to use that to take control of the board and eliminate
whatever defense the board had put in place.
On the legal side, as Verret recognizes, much will depend upon whether
and how the Delaware courts use the Blasius standard to review such
defenses. Verret suggests that the courts may not believe Blasius applies to
the exercise of a federal nomination right, as opposed to a right given by
state law or by the corporate charter or bylaw.28 5 I do not think the courts
should follow Verret on this point. Although the mandatory nature of Rule
14a- 11 is indeed objectionable, nonetheless the rule does work to make the
shareholder franchise more real. The Delaware Supreme Court recognized
in CA, Inc. that the right to vote without a right to affordably affect who is
on the ballot is a limited right indeed, and attempts to strengthen that right
are well within the protected sphere of Blasius.2 86 Moreover, if the courts
did follow Verret in distinguishing the federal nomination right as not
deserving Blasius protection, it would create an incentive that boards might
not appreciate. Shareholders would then have stronger reason to enact their
own bylaw giving more generous access than Rule 14a- 11, since a
nomination process under such a bylaw would clearly be subject to Blasius
protection.
On the other hand, I do agree with Verret that it makes some sense to
soften the Blasius standard, so that when Blasius is invoked as applying to
the facts of a case it is not in effect dispositive as deciding the case for
shareholders. With such a tough standard, courts will be hesitant to invoke
it. A standard that goes further in balancing the board's interest will be a
standard that courts are more willing to use. But courts should not dilute
Blasius all the way down to the weak Unocal standard, the analog for
takeover defenses. As Bebchuk points out, the court in Unocal defended its
2 8 5. Id.
286. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008).
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weak standard there in part with the argument that if shareholders are
unhappy with a takeover defense, they can replace the board.287 Making it
easy for boards to block shareholders from replacing them would make a
travesty of the accountability mechanisms supposedly embedded within
corporate law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Shareholder activism and demand for proxy access to nominate board
candidates have increased dramatically over the past decade. In response,
Delaware's law has moved somewhat closer to an optimal rule for
shareholder proxy access as CA, Inc. and the new section 112 have made it
clear that shareholders may amend the bylaws to allow for proxy access.
Delaware has not yet made it to the optimal rule, though. The annoying
fiduciary duty out requirement and the possibility of board counter-
amendments reduce somewhat the effectiveness of the bylaw power. More
importantly, the default rule remains no proxy access. Delaware's
movement, and its relation to the optimal rule, are entirely in keeping with
its general pattern. It shows flexibility and a willingness to adapt to
changing circumstances in a move towards the optimum. That is
particularly so in the face of threatened federal intervention. However, it
remains short of the optimum, in a direction that favors the interests of
managers over shareholders.2 88
Where Delaware's managerialism keeps it far enough away from the
optimum, federal intervention in corporate governance rules becomes
attractive. That is particularly so where as here federal rules burdening
shareholder participation in the proxy process have been a good part of the
problem. 2 89 But that federal intervention should be as modest as possible
and reserve as much space for state and individual company variation as
possible.
The circumstances of corporate governance failures and financial crisis
do indeed seem to have pushed the SEC closer to an optimal response. The
new proxy access rules get us closer. They set a quite plausible default rule
and improve upon the old altering rule in one direction by facilitating
shareholder bylaw proposals that would allow more generous access than
the default rule under Rule 14a- 11. Had the SEC responded to strong
pressure against its proposal by retaining Rule 14a- 11 and the revisions to
287. Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 680.
288. Supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
289. Black, supra note 278, at 822-24.
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Rule 14a-8, but allowing shareholder bylaws to opt out of the Rule 14a- 11
default in any direction, we would have actually reached what I take to be
the optimal set of rules in this area.
Alas, the SEC did not back down, and hence we have not yet reached the
optimal set of rules. But one can hope that if in the future the SEC backs
down in the face of a backlash, it will do so only by allowing shareholders
to opt out in any direction they choose. If that happens, we will have
reached a fully optimal set of default and altering rules for shareholder
proxy access.

